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Abstract 
 
 
The Use of Financial Statements to Predict the Stock Market Effects of Systemic Crises  
 
 
By 
 
 
Mohammad Almakrami 
 
Claremont Graduate University: 2013 
 
 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 had divesting effects around the globe. Many 
financial institutions and government officials failed to see the build up of problems 
predicting the crisis and hence failed to take actions to keep the crisis from breaking 
out. Thus, it is important to see if the emerging problems could have been identified in 
advance in order to develop types of analysis that could help us avoid future crises. A 
full investigation of such possibilities will require many different studies taking different 
approaches. This dissertation contributes to that collective effort by investigating the 
extent to which balance sheet information could have been used to identify the 
emerging problems. We implement our research strategy by analyzing what types of 
balance sheet information did the best job of explaining how hard different major 
financial institutions were hit during the crisis.     
We constructed a large data set of financial variables from the financial reports of 
financial institutions over the years 2002 to 2011. We used this data to developed 
models to predict the damage to an individual firm when a systemic crisis occurred 
based on its financial position and performance over varying time periods and relative to
other institutions’ characteristics. We used changes in stock market prices as our 
measure of performance. We found that the financial leverage ratio and the mismatch 
between current assets and current liabilities are the most significant ratios to predict 
the degree of stock market declines each institution would face if a systemic crisis 
occurred. We quantified the degree of the financial leverage and current ratios in two 
different ways, an average level and accumulated time-weighted rate of change over 
different lags of periods using two different estimation techniques. We found that the 
financial leverage and current ratios can be used as early warning signals based on 
both the multivariable fractional polynomials estimation technique and structural 
equation modeling. However, the out-of-sample tests showed that the imbalance 
between current assets and current liability would be the only significant predictor of the 
changes in stock market prices. The test confirmed that the changes in pre-crisis stock 
prices are less sensitive to the leverage ratio but more sensitive during crisis.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 had divesting effects around the globe. Many 
financial institutions and government officials failed to see the build up of problems 
predicting the crisis and hence failed to take actions to keep the crisis from breaking 
out. Thus, it is important to see if the emerging problems could have been identified in 
advance in order to develop types of analysis that could help us avoid future crises. A 
full investigation of such possibilities will require many different studies taking different 
approaches. This dissertation contributes to that collective effort by investigating the 
extent to which balance sheet information could have been used to identify the 
emerging problems. We implement our research strategy by analyzing what types of 
balance sheet information did the best job of explaining how hard different major 
financial institutions were hit during the crisis.     
We constructed a large data set of financial variables from the financial reports of 
financial institutions over the years 2002 to 2011. We used this data to developed 
models to predict the damage to an individual firm when a systemic crisis occurred 
based on its financial position and performance over varying time periods and relative to 
other institutions’ characteristics. We used changes in stock market prices as our 
measure of performance. We found that the financial leverage ratio and the mismatch 
between current assets and current liabilities are the most significant ratios to predict 
the degree of stock market declines each institution would face if a systemic crisis 
occurred. We quantified the degree of the financial leverage and current ratios in two 
different ways, an average level and accumulated time-weighted rate of change over 
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different lags of periods using two different estimation techniques. We found that the 
financial leverage and current ratios can be used as early warning signals based on 
both the multivariable fractional polynomials estimation technique and structural 
equation modeling. However, the out-of-sample tests showed that the imbalance 
between current assets and current liability would be the only significant predictor of the 
changes in stock market prices. The test confirmed that the changes in pre-crisis stock 
prices are less sensitive to the leverage ratio but more sensitive during crisis. By 
examining each firm’s financial records by themselves, we can analyze indicators 
deviating from the norm from those financial reports as potential key warning signs. 
Additionally, due to the massive scale of such a systemic event, it is appropriate to test 
the outcomes against leading variables in order to understand how multinational firms 
identified in this study were affected. 
The most significant factor that emerged during the economic growth period pre-
dating the crisis related to issues of mispricing financial risks.  Due to the nature of 
these risks, serious flaws existed in the financial models that were used to calculate the 
risk of securities such as market-backed securities (MBS) and credit default swap 
(CDS). Thus undervaluing these particular risks by professionals in the field of finance 
and economics during that era led not only to the increase of the size and the volume of 
these traded securities, but also to the miscalculation of the values of balance sheet 
items such as assets and liabilities. Another factor related to the implementation of 
expansionary monetary policies by governments to stimulate economies coupled with 
the poor deregulation over those years which allowed financial firms to increase their 
leverage ratios to excessive levels (Willett, 2009). 
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A third factor related to financial statements emphasizes on the impacts of the 
complexity and difficulties encountered by investors and users of these statements 
concerning their understanding and interpreting various types of risks related to the 
market, credit, and liquidity due to the lack of inadequate risk disclosures in financial 
reports. Some researchers argue that limited transparency regarding the on- and off-
balance sheet items coupled with a declining economic environment will lead into 
disorderly market correction and inadequate market discipline, in particular during crises 
periods (Papa, 2011).1 All of these factors by themselves or interacting with each other 
boosted exposure to the counterparty defaults on obligations to unprecedented levels 
that an individual firm faced. 
On the other hand, if a firm cannot generate cash internally via operations, it will 
find various channels to generate cash like issuing new shares, selling some assets, or 
incurring new debts. Therefore, the organization that runs a negative cash flow from 
operation over many years to meet basic business requirements will increase the ratio 
of leverage to unsustainable levels. Ultimately, on an aggregated basis, the whole 
market exposed to an extreme amount of shortfall of capital as a result of these defaults 
makes a good recipe for a crisis. 
There is significant debate among scholars regarding every essential aspect 
involved in crisis analysis. First, scholars disagree on an appropriate measure for the 
                                                
1 Disorderly market correction refers to how the market adjusts during the crisis event when a 
state of economic is declining. The shortage of liquidity forces financial institutions to sell a large 
amount of their assets or to raise new debts to meet their obligations, and that incurs them with 
high cost when spreads are high. Inadequate market discipline refers to mispricing the different 
types of risks such as market, credit, and liquidity risk and accordingly misallocation of capital, in 
particular, when it combines with declining economic environment. For more details see Papa 
(2011). 
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dependent variable that can accurately quantify the effect of financial crisis on an 
individual institution. Second, there is a conflict regarding the independent variables 
whether leading indicators should associate with financial reports or macroeconomic 
factors or both. The third controversy concerns assessing the impacts of this crisis on 
firms through investigating a set of indicators over varying lags of periods. For example, 
an early study implemented by Beaver (1967) found that a cash flow measure was the 
most significant variable to predict firms’ bankruptcy, while another study conducted by 
Altman (1968) found other financial ratios related to profitability, performance, and 
solvency were the most significant indicators to predict firms’ bankruptcy. Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) used financial ratios to attempt to measure systemic risk and to 
predict the individual institution’s participation to that risk found a set of balance sheet 
ratios were significant as leading indicators, while a study completed by Acharya, 
Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) found the ratio of leverage was the only 
ratio to have made a significant contribution to predict firms’ contribution to the systemic 
risk.  
Another area of controversy that has emerged among researchers relates to the 
implementation of various types of methodologies and techniques when assessing the 
incidence of financial crises. The most common method is the use of linear regression 
or logistic regression to predict outcome of a categorical dependent variable. The aim of 
these approaches is to test the statistical significance of diverse indicators in defining 
the occurrence or the probability of occurrence of a financial crisis through a cross-
section of firms or countries. Secondly, the non-parametric method starts by selecting 
control variables for a crisis which then determines threshold levels of these variables 
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when it gives statistically significant results beyond those levels. The problem with this 
approach is that the threshold level determined within a sample and the significant 
results might not hold when conducted on out-of-sample tests. Another approach uses 
qualitative and quantitative analysis for the performance of indicator variables around 
the time the crisis occurred by making a crisis group and non-crisis group. This kind of 
analysis is based on panel analysis where the researchers try to predict the time of a 
crisis rather than analyzing the incidence at one point of time as cross-sectional does.  
By taking all these controversies into account, the primary contribution that this 
dissertation makes to the existing literature is that rather than focusing upon how and 
why this financial crisis originated in the U.S., we concentrate upon a set of intervening 
variables critical the effective performance of financial institutions and examine the 
outcome of those intervening variables and what firms will suffer the most based upon 
their pre-crisis performance. 
Additionally, we investigate which firms proved most vulnerable during the crisis 
by using two different estimation techniques including structural equation modeling and 
multivariable fractional polynomials over various lag periods. We concentrate our study 
on financial statements’ data between 2002 to 2011 for 52 American financial 
institutions on a quarterly basis, focusing on variables associated with firms’ 
performance, profitability, and solvency. Our results indicate that the capital structure 
and liquidity ratios over a two years lag period are the most significant indicators in 
determining the impact of a crisis on firms’ stock market prices.  
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The study takes the following format; chapter two is a review of literature. 
Chapter three introduces the methodology of the study and how the variables were 
operationalized. Chapter four presents the empirical study and analysis using structural 
equation modeling estimation technique. Chapter five presents the empirical study and 
analysis using multivariable fractional polynomials estimation technique. Chapter six 
presents our analysis and results using the out-of-sample tests. Finally, Chapter seven 
summarizes conclusions and offers recommendations.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The primary objective of this study is to calculate the expected changes in the 
prices of stocks in the scenario of when a financial crisis hits the financial market based 
on the fundamental characteristics of financial firms that are related to profitability and 
sustainability over different periods of time.  
The literature has introduced different models to measure the expected change 
in stock prices or asset returns starting from single-factor to multiple factor models in an 
attempt to measure and control risk associated with the changes in these different 
factors. The one single-factor model is commonly referred to as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) otherwise known as the market model that was introduced by 
Jack Treynor in 1962 (French, 2003). This model assumes that all of the variation in 
stock prices is fully explained by a single factor, the systematic risk that shows the 
sensitivity of each stock price to the market index, and eliminates other factors such as 
inflation or interest rates, which might have their own impacts on asset returns. The 
market model, which takes into account only systematic risk, has shown an incomplete 
explanation of risks (Bodie, Gray, and Merton, 2001). 
Multifactor models can be characterized as fundamental macroeconomic or 
microeconomic models depend on the type of factors used. Macroeconomic multifactor 
models build upon the surprises, the differences between actual and expected values. 
An early study showed macroeconomic variables that significantly explain the variations 
in stock prices were associated with firms’ expected cash flows directly or indirectly via 
interest rate effects (Chen, 1986). The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) describes the 
expected change in price as a linear function of the risks associated with different macro 
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factors. Burmeister and McElroy showed that we might reject the market model in favor 
of a multifactor-model such as APT at the 1 percent level of significance (Burmeister 
and McElroy, 1988).   
The fundamental microeconomic models are constructed on the characteristics 
of stocks that can significantly explain cross-sectional differences between firms’ stocks 
based on changes in factors such as market capitalization, size, and financial leverage. 
The model pioneered by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (Fama, 1992), which is 
commonly referred to as the Fama-French model, adds two factors associated with 
market capitalization and book-to-market ratio to the market model in order to provide a 
more detailed analysis of risk than CAPM does. The changing nature of different risk 
factors makes these factors act differently over stable and unstable economy. These 
different scenarios lead to violate the assumptions behind models such as CAPM. For 
example, the market model assumes that lending and borrowing will be at a risk free 
rate for all firms, and the transaction cost is equal to zero. Most of the models build 
upon probabilities which depend mainly on market volatilities and the associated 
variations in stock market prices to predict the outcome of a crisis. In fact, stable and 
growing economy is associated with low market volatilities and a low level of 
correlations between firms’ pre-crisis stock market prices, while these volatilities and the 
correlation levels between stock market prices increase to risky levels during crisis 
(Angkinand, Wihlborg, and Willett, 2011).  
Several publications have appeared in recent years documenting a number of 
intervening variables that place firms at a point of vulnerability to crises including 
financial ratios related to performance, profitability, solvency, capital structure, and a 
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firm’s size. Although some of the relevant research focused upon sources of crises, the 
studies presented in this review converge upon a set of intervening variables pertinent 
to an individual firm’s performance that when deviating from the norm can act as 
potential key warning signs. The literature presented in this study particularly introduces 
different models to measure the expected change in stock prices or other measures of 
the effects of a financial crisis.  
Max Heine (2000) adapted and updated two earlier studies related to Z-Score 
and ZETA models for Edward Altman (1968) and Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan 
(1977) respectively to assess the effectiveness of the use of financial ratios to predict a 
corporation’s bankruptcy or a firm being under distress. Altman and his fellows, in both 
Z-Score and ZETA models, modified and updated two other studies; Beaver (1967) and 
Deakin (1972) by the use of financial ratios to predict the same outcome (firm’s 
bankruptcy). They divided a sample of 66 firms into two groups (failed and non-failed or 
stressed and non-stressed) with 33 firms in each group. Altman et al. collected financial 
ratios data from 1946 until 1965 on a yearly basis. They categorized these ratios into 
five classes (liquidity, profitability, leverage, solvency, and activity). In the early works, 
Beaver (1967) used univariate technique but Deakin (1972) continued evaluating the 
same 14 financial ratios used by Beaver but adapted a series of multivariate 
discriminant model, while Altman et al. used a multiple discriminant statistical 
methodology to evaluate the role of a set of financial ratios in predicting firm’s 
bankruptcy. 
Because evaluating firms’ operating and financial positions is a subject to the 
analysis of their financial ratios, Altman attempted to fill in the gap between the use of 
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traditional ratios as analytical technique and firms’ performance. While, Beaver found 
only one single ratio of cash flow to debt as the best indicator to predict firm bankruptcy, 
Altman found a set of financial ratios related to performance, profitability, and solvency 
prevailed as the most significant leading indicators to firms’ bankrupts. Altman argued 
that the use of univariate methodology has a possibility to produce vague results as a 
firm might be recognized to be headed towards bankruptcy due to poor profitability or 
solvency ratios while it has a better than average liquidity ratio which would make the 
situation appear to be not serious. 1  
Examining a list of 22 financial ratios, Altman examined 86 distressed firms 
between the years 1969 and 1975, 110 distressed firms between 1976 and 1995, and 
120 distressed firms between 1997 and 1999. Altman found that the Z-score model 
accurately predicted a firm’s bankruptcy by 82 percent and 94 percent using the cutoff 
score of 2.675. Altman found five ratios that prevailed as the best set of ratios to predict 
firm bankruptcy. The final discriminant function is as follows: 
 Z-Score = 0.012 X1 + 0.014 X2 + 0.033 X3 + 0.006 X4  + 0.999 X5  
Where: 
Z-Score = the overall index 
X1 = working capital/total assets 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
                                                
1 Altman argued that a set of several measures with a meaningful predictive model will 
overcome the shortcomings of any univariate analysis. In an indication of these financial ratios 
should be used as analytical technique. For more detail see E. Altman (1968). 
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X3 = earnings before interest and taxes/total assets 
X4 = market value equity/book value of total liability 
X5 = sales/total assets 
In 1977, a revised Z-Score model introduced by changing the market value of 
equity with book value of equity to get: 
Z’-Score = 0.717 X1 + 0.847 X2 + 3.107 X3 + 0.420 X4 + 0.998 X5 
Where: 
X4 = book value equity/book value of total liability 
Altman et al. (1977) introduced the ‘ZETA’ model by collecting data for 111 firms 
between 1969 and 1975 and created two groups including 53 bankrupt firms and 58 
non-bankrupt firms. In this model, Altman et al. selected 28 variables with only seven 
financial ratios to be chosen as the most significant and reliable as a group, while the 
model would not be more significant if more variables were added. These financial 
ratios and their descriptions are shown in Table 2.1 below.  
Table 2.1: Description of the seven variables  
Number The Ratio Description 
1 Return on Assets Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Assets 
2 Stability of Earnings Normalized measure of the standard Error of 
estimate around a 5 to 10 years trend in Return on 
Assets 
3 Debt Service Earnings before Interest and Taxes / Total Interest 
Payments 
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4 Cumulative 
profitability 
Retained Earnings / Total Assets  
5 Liquidity Current Assets / Current Liabilities 
6 Capitalization Common Equity / Total Capital 
7 Size Total Assets 
 
By utilizing the ZETA model which depends upon selecting various indicators and 
setting threshold levels, Altman et al. increased the accuracy to 96.2 percent one period 
prior to bankruptcy and to 70 percent five annual periods prior to bankruptcy versus 
93.9 percent and 36 percent for Z-Score model respectively. The model will signal a 
warning flag if these threshold levels are exceeded in a sense of that firm is facing a 
stress situation.1 Their results are shown in Table 2.2 below where these variables can 
be classified as profitability (1-6), coverage and earnings relative to leverage (8-14), 
liquidity (15-18) capitalization (19-23), earnings variability (24-26) and few others. 
Table 2.2: Estimation results for ZETA model based on one period prior to 
bankruptcy 
No. Variables Failed Non-Failed Univariate F-
test 
1 EBIT/TA -0.0055 0.1117 54.3 
2 NATC/TC -0.0297 0.0742 36.6 
3 SALES/TA 1.3120 1.6200 3.3 
4 SALES/TC 2.1070 2.1600 0.0 
5 EBIT/SALES 0.0020 0.0070 30.2 
6 NATC/SALES -0.0153 0.0400 33.1 
                                                
1 For more details see Altman et al. (1977).  
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7 LOG TANG.ASSETS 1.9854 2.2220 5.5 
8 INT COV -0.5995 5.3410 26.1 
9 LOG NO 8 0.9625 1.1620 26.1 
10 FIXED CHARG COV 0.2992 2.1839 15.7 
11 Earnings /Debt -0.0792 0.1806 32.8 
12 Earnings 5 yr. Maturities -0.1491 0.6976 8.8 
13 Cash/Flow Fixed charges 0.1513 2.9512 20.9 
14 Cash Flow/TD -0.0173 0.3136 31.4 
15 WC/LTD 0.3532 2.4433 6.0 
16 Current Ratio 1.5757 2.6040 38.2 
17 WC/TA 0.1498 0.3086 40.6 
18 WC/Cash expenses 0.1640 0.2467 5.2 
19 Ret. Earn /TA -0.0006 0.2935 114.6 
20 BV Equity/TC 0.2020 0.5260 64.5 
21 MV Equity/TC 0.3423 0.6022 32.1 
22 5 yrs. MV Equity/TL 0.4063 0.6210 31.0 
23 MV Equity/TL 0.6113 1.8449 11.6 
24 SD of est. EBIT/TA 1.6870 5.784 33.8 
25 EBIT drop -3.2272 3.179 9.9 
26 Margin drop -0.2173 0.179 15.6 
27 Capital lease/Asset 0.2514 0.178 4.2 
28 Sales/Fixed Assets 3.1723 4.179 3.5 
 
Where 
EBIT: Earnings before interest and taxes 
NATC: Net available for total capital 
TA: Total tangible assets 
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LTD: Long term debt 
MV: Market value of equity 
TC: Total capital 
TD: Total debt 
WC: Working capital  
CF: Cash flow 
 
Capital structure also played a crucial role in the 2008 financial crisis. Although 
many of the financial institutions were in positions of meeting the minimum capital 
requirements that were imposed by Basel I and II, this failed to stop the panic in the 
financial industry promoting governments to step in to support and bail them out.1 In 
fact, the massive rescues of these firms have led to modifying such capital requirements 
through introducing Basel III by implementing a 1/N rule for leverage ratio. In 2010, 
Basel Committee introduced Tier I leverage ratio (i.e. 3 percent) which means an 
individual firm can leverage its equity up to 33 times.2   However, the total risk-adjusted 
capital requirement stays the same as before (i.e. 8 percent), Tier I capital requirement 
will increase to 6 percent by 2019, and banks can use capital from Tier II to fill the gap 
between Tier I and total capital requirements.3  
By assessing the relationships between various types of capital ratios and 
movement of stock prices before and during the 2007 crisis, Demirgus-Kunt, 
                                                
1 For more details see Andrew Haldane (2012), Merrouche and Nier (2010), Vinals et al. (2010), 
and Caprio et al. (2010).  
2 Andrew Haldane argued that 7 percent of leverage ratio instead of 3 percent was needed 
therefore large banks can survive the financial crisis in 2008. In addition, a 4 percent leverage 
ratio is required to minimized Type I and II crisis errors. For more details see Andrew Haldane 
(2012).     
3 For more details see Demirguc-Kunt et al (2010). 
 15 
Detragiache and Merrouche (2010) addressed the question of which type of capital 
structure ratios are more relevant to stock changes particularly during the time of crisis 
and how effective such capital structure can improve the bank’s ability to absorb 
unexpected financial shocks. 
Collecting financial data for 381 banks from 12 economies over the period 
2005Q1 to 2009Q1, Demirgus-Kunt et al. base their analysis on two sample sets 
including a full sample and a sample containing only large banks that carried equal to or 
greater than 50 billion in assets while using dummy variables to control for pre-crisis 
and during-crisis periods that took a value of one from 2007Q3 to 2009Q1. Demirgus-
Kunt et al. used the percent change in stock market prices as the dependent variable 
and a set of financial ratios which lagged one year as independent variables while 
selecting two types of capital structure as control variables in order to assess which one 
more effectively predicted the outcome. The first capital ratio measured the total 
regulatory capital (Tier I and Tier II) scaled by Basel Risk-Weighted Assets (RWR) and 
the second capital ratio measured the total regulatory capital scaled by total un-
weighted assets (Leverage). 1  
Demirgus-Kunt et al. find that financial leverage is more significant and reliable 
than risk-weighted asset ratio with respect to the sub-sample of large banks during the 
crisis at a one percent level but not during pre-crisis periods, while the full sample 
shows pre-crisis leverage ratios to be significant at the 10 percent level and RWR 
                                                
1 The regulatory capital includes Tier I and Tier II. Where: Tier I capital consists of shareholder 
funds and perpetual, non-cumulative preference shares, and Tier II capital consists of hybrid 
capital, subordinated debt, loan loss reserves, and valuation reserves. For more detail see 
Demirgus-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche (2010) 
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significant at the 10 percent level during the crisis. That tells us that the changes in pre-
crisis stock prices are less sensitive to the leverage ratio but more sensitive during 
crisis. In addition, the regression results presented by Demirgus-Kunt et al. are shown in 
Table 2.3 which indicates that smaller decline in stock prices when the crisis hits the 
economy is most likely a result of institutions that were better capitalized.  
Table 2.3: Estimation results for Demirgus-Kunt, Detragiache, and Merrouche 
(2010) 
 Full Sample Large Banks 
Independent 
Variables 
RWR Leverage RWR Leverage 
Pre-Crisis: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Capital 0.023 
(0.036) 
0.078* 
(0.046) 
-0.155 
(0.102) 
-0.046 
(0.089) 
Liquidity 0.016* 
(0.008) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.041 
(0.026) 
Deposits 0.013 
(0.009) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.013 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
Net Loans 0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.02* 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.012) 
Provisions -1.204*** 
(0.374) 
-1.043** 
(0.428) 
-1.333* 
(0.76) 
-1.402 
(0.886) 
Size 0.053 
(0.070) 
0.07 
(0.078) 
-0.698 
(0.839) 
-0.209 
(0.736) 
MV/BV Equity 0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.108 
(0.072) 
0.093 
(0.075) 
Price-Earning 0.000 -0.001*** 0.009*** -0.009*** 
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(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) 
Beta -0.233 
(0.242) 
-0.082 
(0.257) 
-0.239 
(0.293) 
-0.338 
(0.349) 
During-Crisis:     
Capital 0.114* 
(0.063) 
0.124 
(0.096) 
0.207 
(0.143) 
0.553*** 
(0.194) 
Liquidity -0.037** 
(0.017) 
-0.037 
(0.022) 
0.098* 
(0.056) 
0.094 
(0.066) 
Deposits 0.036** 
(0.016) 
0.038* 
(0.020) 
0.074*** 
(0.022) 
0.102*** 
(0.030) 
Net Loans -0.030* 
(0.016) 
-0.031* 
(0.018) 
-0.032 
(0.028) 
-0.073** 
(0.028) 
Provisions -3.014*** 
(0.995) 
-3.644*** 
(1.076) 
-2.947 
(2.373) 
-2.927 
(3.246) 
Size -0.038 
(0.088) 
0.043 
(0.090) 
-1.265 
(0.830) 
-0.73 
(0.730) 
MV/BV Equity 0.027 
(0.064) 
0.006 
(0.062) 
0.043 
(0.070) 
0.024 
(0.042) 
Price-Earning -0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Beta -0.594* 
(0.350) 
-0.754** 
(0.358) 
-0.105 
(0.506) 
0.014 
(0.658) 
No. Obs 4254 3779 887 741 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.31 0.32 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price during the financial crisis from 
2007q3 until 2009q1 
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Berger and Bouwman (2009) examine the impact of capital structure before the 
2008 crisis regarding a bank’s ability to survive banking or market crises.1 By 
categorizing crises in the US to a banking crisis and a market crisis, Berger and 
Bouwman collected financial data from 1984Q1 to 2008Q4 for every commercial and 
credit card bank in the US (18326 banks) on a quarterly basis and created three 
subsamples according to the banks’ sizes (small, medium, and large).2 Berger and 
Bouwman first used logit to assess the probability that a bank is more likely to survive a 
crisis. Although, they find that capital helps small banks to survive the two types of 
crises, they find that capital helps medium and large banks to survive a banking crisis 
only. The results are shown in Table 2.4. 
Second, Berger and Bouwman regress the percentage change in market share 
on the average level of capital ratio and same set of control variables over the same lag 
during or after the crisis.3 Berger and Bouwman find higher capital ratios enable all 
banks to improve their market share pre-crisis but only small and large banks maintain 
that improvement in market share after the crisis in the case of banking crises. But in 
the case of marketing crisis only small banks can benefit from having higher capital pre-
                                                
1  Berger and Bouwman categorize crises occurred in the US into two types; banking and 
marketing crises, and distinguish between them according to their sources. Banking crisis is that 
caused by banking system such as subprime crisis in 2008, and market crisis is that caused by 
others such as dotcom crisis. In addition, capital structure refers to leverage or equity capital 
ratio and has been calculated here as the total equity capital scaled by gross total assets. 
2 Small banks refer to banks that have gross total assets (GTA) up to $1 billion, medium banks 
that have gross total assets between $1 to $3 billions, and large banks that have GTA’s value 
above $3 billions).  
3 They calculate the percent change of market share as the difference between average level of 
market share during the crisis or over 8 quarter after it and the average level of market share 
over 8 quarter lag period and multiply by 100. For more detail see Berger and Bouwman (2009).  
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crisis and also can maintain that improvement afterward. The results are shown in Table 
2.5. 
Thirdly, Berger and Bouwman regress the change of return on equity (ROE) 
during and after a crisis on average level of capital ratio and the set of control variables 
to assess the effect of capital ratio on banks profitability. Berger and Bouwman find that 
higher capital shows no evidence of improvement in medium banks’ profitability, while 
showing improvement in small and large banks during the banking crisis. However, only 
large banks can sustain the effect of higher capital upon profitability after a crisis. The 
results are shown in Table 2.6. 
In addition, Berger and Bouwman find that improvement in market share and 
profitability due to higher capital ratios would lead to higher stock returns and abnormal 
stock returns for large banks if a banking crisis hits the economy. This, however, does 
not hold in a market crisis. Ironically, Berger and Bouwman find that in normal times 
higher capital benefits most small banks and that capital ratio is more important during 
crises, but not much before the crises.  
Table 2.4: Estimation results of the effects of pre-crisis Equity Ratio on the ability 
to survive banking crises for Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
 Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
Independent 
Variables 
SURV1 SURV4 SURV1 SURV4 SURV1 SURV4 
EQRAT 
(Leverage) 
16.054*** 
(10.74) 
12.759*** 
(9.96) 
16.422** 
(2.19) 
15.968** 
(2.33) 
43.567** 
(2.43) 
19.427 
(1.43) 
Ln(GTA) 0.076* 
(1.87) 
0.061 
(1.63) 
-0.028 
(-0.07) 
-0.432 
(-1.13) 
0.117 
(0.47) 
0.413* 
(1.70) 
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Z-Score 6.729** 
(2.49) 
10.013*** 
(4.01) 
20.021** 
(2.04) 
11.345 
(1.36) 
2.182 
(0.16) 
17.192 
(1.32) 
D-BHC -0.667*** 
(-8.24) 
-0.713*** 
(-9.75) 
0.103 
(0.26) 
-0.031 
(-0.08) 
1.939*** 
(2.96) 
1.246** 
(2.10) 
HHI 0.298 
(0.85) 
0.349 
(1.11) 
4.818** 
(2.19) 
4.480** 
(2.23) 
2.953 
(0.90) 
2.000 
(0.70) 
Inc-Growth -1.374 
(-0.90) 
-1.445 
(-1.05) 
-6.845 
(-0.91) 
-5.144 
(-0.71) 
-6.251 
(-0.42) 
-2.156 
(-0.17) 
Ln(POP) -0.216*** 
(-11.88) 
-0.228*** 
(-13.74) 
0.049 
(0.60) 
0.032 
(0.41) 
0.076 
(0.75) 
0.060 
(0.64) 
Constant 2.854*** 
(5.51) 
3.128*** 
(6.66) 
-1.158 
(-0.19) 
4.786 
(0.86) 
-5.688 
(-1.22) 
-8.787** 
(-2.0) 
Obs 10364 10364 309 309 244 244 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: failed or survived the financial crisis 
 
Table 2.5: Estimation results of the effects of pre-crisis Liquidity Ratio and Gross 
Total Assets on market Share during banking crises for Berger and Bouwman 
(2009) 
 Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
Dep. 
Vars. 
%Change GTA %Change 
L.C.Share 
%Change GTA %Change 
L.C.Share 
%Change GTA %Change 
L.C.Share 
Ind. Vars. Durin
g 
After Durin
g 
After Durin
g 
After Durin
g 
After Durin
g 
After Durin
g 
After 
EQRAT 
Leverage 
1.118
*** 
(21.29
) 
1.019
*** 
(6.71) 
4.496
*** 
(22.01
) 
7.428
*** 
(10.55
) 
0.495 
(1.48) 
-0.291 
(-
0.26) 
1.308
** 
(2.24) 
4.174 
(0.89) 
1.101
*** 
(3.96) 
0.492 
(0.80) 
3.096
*** 
(3.62) 
10.59
*** 
(6.39) 
Ln(GTA) -
0.004
-
0.039
-
0.029
-
0.257
-
0.122
-
0.123
-
0.266
-
0.257
-
0.009
-
0.015
-
0.067
-
0.094
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** 
(-2.2) 
*** 
(-
7.69) 
*** 
(-
4.28) 
*** 
(-
11.60) 
*** 
(-
5.24) 
0 
(-
1.58) 
*** 
(-
3.93) 
0 
(-
0.98) 
0 
(-
1.08) 
0 
(-
0.49) 
*** 
(-
3.41) 
0 
(-
1.25) 
Z-Score -
0.468
*** 
(-
6.25) 
0.260 
(1.09) 
-
0.640
** 
(-
2.01) 
6.112
*** 
(4.72) 
0.152 
(0.52) 
2.024 
(1.5) 
0.147 
(0.20) 
-2.516 
(-
0.53) 
0.226 
(0.58) 
3.488
** 
(1.99) 
-0.944 
(-
0.87) 
-8.242 
(-
1.45) 
D-BHC -0.007 
** 
(-
8.24) 
0.011 
(1.40) 
0.040
*** 
(2.90) 
0.217
*** 
(5.69) 
0.029
* 
(1.65) 
0.155
*** 
(2.80) 
0.100 
(1.54) 
0.376 
(1.65) 
-0.008 
(-
0.21) 
0.074 
(0.73) 
-0.054 
(-
0.38) 
-0.132 
(-
0.20) 
HHI 0.022 
*** 
(2.89) 
0.022 
(0.81) 
-
0.063
* 
(-1.9) 
-
0.421
*** 
(-
2.71) 
0.077 
(1.13) 
-0.090 
(-0.3) 
0.232 
(1.22) 
2.017 
(1.63) 
0.038 
(0.31) 
-0.273 
(-
0.72) 
-0.145 
(-
0.54) 
-0.260 
(-
0.17) 
Inc-
Growth 
0.81**
* 
(14.97
) 
1.875
*** 
(12.24
) 
1.305
*** 
(6.19) 
2.100
*** 
(2.99) 
0.596 
(1.51) 
0.075 
(0.07) 
0.996 
(0.84) 
2.44 
(0.54) 
-0.046 
(-
0.07) 
-
3.805
** 
(-
2.18) 
4.755
* 
(1.81) 
5.847 
(0.87) 
Ln(POP) 0.01**
* 
(12.23
) 
0.024
*** 
(10.74
) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
-
0.046
*** 
(-
4.78) 
-0.001 
(-
0.16) 
0.015 
(1.32) 
0.003 
(0.22) 
-0.005 
(-
0.11) 
-
0.011
* 
(-
1.71) 
-0.014 
(-
0.92) 
-0.022 
(-
1.29) 
-
0.090
* 
(-
1.75) 
Constant -
0.245
*** 
(-
11.08) 
0.171
*** 
(2.86) 
-0.097 
(-
1.09) 
3.603
*** 
(13.21
) 
1.625
*** 
(4.94) 
1.606 
(1.45) 
3.571
*** 
(3.83) 
3.306 
(0.90) 
0.206 
(1.22) 
0.652 
(1.25) 
1.015
*** 
(2.78) 
2.612
* 
(1.76) 
Obs 16856 9070 16856 9070 639 233 639 233 446 209 446 209 
Adj. R2 0.17 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.08 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in gross total assets and liquidity creation as 
measures of the percent change in market share for each bank 
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Table 2.6: Estimation results of the effects of pre-crisis Capital Ratio on 
Profitability during banking crises for Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
 Small Banks Medium Banks Large Banks 
Independent 
Variables 
Change 
ROE 
During 
Change 
ROE After 
Change 
ROE 
During 
Change 
ROE After 
Change 
ROE 
During 
Change 
ROE After 
EQRAT 
(Leverage) 
0.035** 
(2.02) 
-0.157*** 
(-4.84) 
0.015 
(0.14) 
-0.444** 
(-1.99) 
0.172* 
(1.86) 
0.175* 
(1.67) 
Ln(GTA) -0.010*** 
(-12.32) 
-0.007*** 
(-6.12) 
0.008 
(0.76) 
0.029* 
(-1.73) 
-0.003 
(-0.69) 
0.004 
(0.53) 
Z-Score 0.093*** 
(3.28) 
-0.959*** 
(-14.5) 
0.312** 
(2.34) 
-1.459*** 
(-5.13) 
0.218 
(1.20) 
-1.445*** 
(-3.75) 
D-BHC 0.003** 
(2.29) 
0.001 
(0.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.38) 
0.008 
(0.47) 
0.030* 
(1.69) 
0.041* 
(1.69) 
HHI -0.006 
(-1.61) 
-0.042*** 
(-6.01) 
0.078*** 
(2.77) 
-0.129* 
(-1.68) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.063 
(-0.55) 
Inc-Growth -0.086*** 
(-3.59) 
-0.097*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.271 
(-1.22) 
-1.047*** 
(-3.56) 
-0.364 
(-1.32) 
-0.302 
(-0.53) 
Ln(POP) -0.005*** 
(-14.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.96) 
-0.004 
(-1.55) 
-0.010*** 
(-2.71) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
-0.007 
(-1.65) 
Constant 0.135*** 
(13.95) 
0.151*** 
(10.79) 
-0.148 
(-0.98) 
-0.134 
(-0.65) 
-0.087 
(-1.10) 
0.053 
(0.37) 
Obs 16856 9070 639 233 446 209 
Adj. R2 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.04 0.05 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in return on equity (ROE) during and after a crisis for 
each bank 
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In another study conducted by Weib, Bostandizic and Neumann (2013), local and 
global measures for systemic risk were regressed as the dependent variables on a set 
of control variables associated with banks’ characteristics including profitability, size, 
and leverage in addition to public safety-net guarantees and macroeconomic 
fundamentals for all countries in the sample and for each crisis covered in their study. 
They followed the same methods of measuring the systemic risk as Schmidt and 
Stadtmuller (2006) and Acharya et al. (2010) by quantifying the change in Lower Tail 
Dependence (LTD) and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) for each bank respectively.1 
Weib et al. ran regressions for different crises (Mexico, Asia, LTCM, Dotcom, 9/11, 
Subprime, and Lehman Brothers). Both global and local results are presented in Table 
2.7.  
Weib et al. find evidence in the extreme case (LTD) and testing locally that banks 
with higher total assets show a significant result as a one standard deviation increase in 
change of LTD would decrease a bank’s probability of a joint crash with the local bank 
index by 4.1 percent in the subprime crisis and 5.2 percent in Lehman Brothers default. 
However these results did not hold when tested globally. Additionally, Weib et al. find 
leverage ratios to be insignificant both locally and globally, while the variable FUNDED 
(governments bail banks out) was significant at the one percent level globally and 
locally for subprime crisis but not for Lehman Brothers default as shown in Table 2.7. 
                                                
1 The Lower Tail Dependence (LTD) for individual bank is estimated by the use of GARCH (1,1) 
models to filter stock returns first before estimating LTD. The Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) 
for individual bank is estimated by calculating the mean of the log of returns on stock market 
prices given that the local or global index experience an extreme downward movements. For 
more details on how to quantify systemic risk by these measures see Schmidt and Stadtmuller 
(2006) and Acharya et al (2010) respectively. 
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Weib et al. find several firm characteristics did not show significant effects in crisis 
events before the subprime crisis.  
By finding significant results associated only with profitability ratio and loan loss 
provision when shifting from local to global systemic risk using the LTD measure, Weib 
et al. concluded that firms’ characteristics have a minor role in explaining extreme 
systemic risk globally. On the other hand, the explanatory power of regressions using 
the first measure of systemic risk (LTD) locally and globally was significantly lower than 
those using the second measure (MES) for moderate systemic risk. 
Ultimately, Weib et al. reached the conclusion that the crises were driven by 
characteristics of the regulatory system such as deposit insurance schemes as it 
predicts the change in MES. For example, a positive relationship between regulatory 
capital and government funding and the systemic measure locally and globally and hold 
that significant relationship over three crises events.  
Table 2.7: Estimation results of the analysis of two crises for Weib, Bostandizic 
and Neumann (2013)  
 Extreme & Local 
Systemic Risk 
Extreme & Global 
Systemic Risk 
Moderate & Local 
Systemic Risk 
Moderate & Global 
Systemic Risk 
Ind. Vars. 1 
Subprime 
2 
Lehman 
Brothers 
3 
Subprime 
4 
Lehman 
Brothers 
5 
Subprime 
6 
Lehman 
Brothers 
7 
Subprime 
8 
Lehman 
Brothers 
OPM 0.000 
(0.565) 
0.000 
(0.905) 
-0.001* 
(0.072) 
0.000 
(0.831) 
0.000 
(0.409) 
-0.000* 
(0.070) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.022) 
MTBV 0.002 
(0.905) 
-0.038* 
(0.060) 
-0.014 
(0.328) 
0.012 
(0.470) 
0.001 
(0.554) 
0.007*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001 
(0.429) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
LogTA -0.046** -0.059** -0.003 0.029 0.005*** 0.020*** -0.002 0.013*** 
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(0.047) (0.040) (0.870) (0.230) (0.006) (0.000) (0.304) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.000 
(0.637) 
0.001 
(0.130) 
0.001 
(0.183) 
-0.001 
(0.305) 
0.000 
(0.190) 
-0.000** 
(0.025) 
0.000 
(0.307) 
0.000 
(0.515) 
LossProv 0.003 
(0.672) 
-0.015 
(0.220) 
-0.006 
(0.330) 
-0.023* 
(0.085) 
0.000 
(0.626) 
0.003** 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.720) 
0.002** 
(0.011) 
LOGNII - 0.011 
(0.514) 
0.011 
(0.221) 
0.005 
(0.711) 
0.002 
(0.202) 
0.000 
(0.932) 
0.003 
(0.128) 
0.002 
(0.176) 
LOANS - -0.001 
(0.543) 
- -0.001 
(0.415) 
- 0.000** 
(0.037) 
- 0.000*** 
(0.005) 
INFL -0.003 
(0.555) 
0.001 
(0.717) 
-0.008* 
(0.073) 
0.004 
(0.281) 
0.001 
(0.223) 
0.000 
(0.300) 
0.000 
(0.939) 
0.000 
(0.465) 
GDPGR 0.002 
(0.848) 
0.007 
(0.339) 
0.000 
(0.989) 
0.014* 
(0.050) 
0.000 
(0.625) 
-
0.002*** 
(0.002) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.003*** 
(0.002) 
HHI 0.007 
(0.967) 
0.131 
(0.536) 
0.356*** 
(0.003) 
0.294* 
(0.064) 
-0.027*** 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.980) 
0.002 
(0.825) 
-0.003 
(0.801) 
POLSTAB 0.045 
(0.244) 
-0.096** 
(0.034) 
0.010 
(0.706) 
0.005 
(0.894) 
0.006*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.225) 
0.001 
(0.624) 
-0.002 
(0.629) 
ROL -0.049 
(0.272) 
0.054 
(0.253) 
-0.061* 
(0.059) 
0.047 
(0.254) 
-0.002 
(0.389) 
0.003 
(0.426) 
-0.006*** 
(0.008) 
0.008** 
(0.049) 
FOREIGN -0.021 
(0.637) 
0.066 
(0.156) 
0.043 
(0.153) 
0.170*** 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.766) 
0.003 
(0.342) 
0.000 
(0.898) 
0.016*** 
(0.000) 
COINS 0.020 
(0.748) 
-0.051 
(0.444) 
-0.025 
(0.499) 
0.003 
(0.959) 
-0.002 
(0.540) 
-0.004 
(0.578) 
-0.005* 
(0.085) 
0.008 
(0.143) 
PMT 0.068 
(0.125) 
0.007 
(0.870) 
0.038 
(0.145) 
-0.003 
(0.925) 
0.000 
(0.932) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
-0.005** 
(0.013) 
0.017*** 
(0.000) 
FUNDED -0.101*** 
(0.010) 
-
0.225*** 
(0.000) 
-0.071** 
(0.014) 
-0.063 
(0.137) 
0.010*** 
(0.000) 
0.015*** 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.407) 
0.005* 
(0.079) 
CRI 0.003 0.008 -0.008 -0.014 0.002** 0.002** -0.001 0.001 
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(0.803) (0.579) (0.332) (0.186) (0.042) (0.031) (0.388) (0.175) 
GOB -0.025 
(0.848) 
0.025 
(0.801) 
-0.043 
(0.584) 
-0.189* 
(0.051) 
0.004 
(0.629) 
-0.022** 
(0.017) 
0.012** 
(0.039) 
-
0.033*** 
(0.001) 
MHI -0.001 
(0.939) 
-0.001 
(0.937) 
-0.015** 
(0.040) 
0.021** 
(0.045) 
0.000 
(0.483) 
-0.002 
(0.124) 
-0.001 
(0.130) 
0.002** 
(0.010) 
IOSA -0.006 
(0.800) 
0.003 
(0.890) 
0.013 
(0.293) 
0.009 
(0.622) 
0.002 
(0.164) 
0.000 
(0.895) 
0.001 
(0.174) 
0.001 
(0.454) 
OSP -0.010 
(0.232) 
0.002 
(0.862) 
0.004 
(0.531) 
0.017** 
(0.028) 
0.000 
(0.329) 
0.003*** 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.005) 
0.002*** 
(0.002) 
ADRI 0.024 
(0.242) 
-0.010 
(0.595) 
0.041*** 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.695) 
0.002* 
(0.078) 
-0.001 
(0.751) 
0.003** 
(0.017) 
-0.001 
(0.585) 
Obs 854 888 854 888 854 888 854 888 
R2 0.025 0.091 0.051 0.126 0.155 0.266 0.195 0.269 
Adj.R2 0.001 0.068 0.027 0.104 0.133 0.247 0.175 0.251 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the change in Lower Tail Dependence (LTD) and Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (MES) for each bank 
 
Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2013) analyze variables causing firms’ defaults 
striving to offer beneficial solutions for regulators. Blundell-Wignall and Roulet 
investigate the impact of both macro- and micro-variables upon firms’ defaults by 
quantifying the distance to default by measuring the number of standard deviations 
away from the default point. They define the default point as the market-valued of 
assets equals or lower than the total book-valued of debt. Blundell-Wignall and Roulet 
use the Black-Scholes model to measure the market-valued of assets and throughout 
the data for 94 publically traded banks and dealers in the US and EU had market 
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capitalization above $5 billion from 2004 to 2011.1 Panel regression was used to assess 
the changes in the outcome across all banks over the specified period. Simple leverage 
and Tier I leverage ratios were used as control variables. 2 
Blundell-Wignall and Roulet find simple leverage to be significant relative to Tier I 
leverage ratio as shown in Table 2.8 and Table 2.9 according to univariate and 
multivariate models respectively. First, the univariate model indicated that regular 
leverage is significant at the one percent level in predicting the distance to default 
compared to the Tier I leverage ratio. In addition, a group of other variables showed 
significant relationships with the outcome such as firm size, trading assets, the gross 
market value of derivatives, cross-border revenue and beta.  
Conversely, the multivariate model showed that regular or simple leverage ratios 
were significant over three subsamples particularly in the ‘all banks’ sample which was 
significant at the one percent level. Tier I leverage was not significant in the multivariate 
model. Firm size was significant at the one percent level when Tier I was used, and at 
the five percent level when simple leverage was used. However, firm size was not 
significant for the third subsample (other large banks).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 For more information about Black-Scholes model see Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1973). 
2 Simple leverage ratio calculated as {total assets / (total equity – goodwill and other intangible 
assets)}, and Tier I leverage ratio calculated as {Tier I capital / total risk-weighted assets}. For 
more details see Adrian Blundell-Wignall and Caroline Roulet (2013).  
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Table 2.8: Estimation results of the univariate model for Blundell-Wignall and 
Roulet (2013)  
 
Cons. 6.87**
* 
(27.1
5) 
6.51**
* 
(26.6
6) 
5.79**
* 
(19.6
8) 
5.83**
* 
(31.4
9) 
5.40**
* 
(19.9
8) 
6.34**
* 
(17.7
5) 
-
4.16**
* 
(-
3.24) 
4.84**
* 
(2.47) 
5.58**
* 
(25.9
3) 
7.32**
* 
(4.14) 
8.47**
* 
(48.1
1) 
5.16*** 
(45.27) 
4.00**
* 
(14.7
6) 
Bank 
Size 
TA/SysT
A 
-
7.83**
* 
(-
3.83) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
Leverage 
TA/(TE-
GW) 
- -
0.02**
* 
(-
2.33) 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
TILev 
TierI/RW
A 
- - 2.97 
(0.87) 
- - - - - - - - - - 
IBA/TA - - - 1.30 
(0.80) 
- - - - - - - - - 
TD/TA - - - - 2.56** 
(2.28) 
- - - - - - - - 
WFD/TL - - - - - -1.08 
(-
1.16) 
- - - - - - - 
GMV/TA - - - - - - -
4.16**
* 
(-
3.24) 
- - - - - - 
No. - - - - - - - 0.01 
(0.58) 
- - - - - 
XB/TR - - - - - - - - 1.53** 
(2.00) 
- - - - 
Exp/Emp - - - - - - - - - -0.32 
(-
0.79) 
- - - 
Beta - - - - - - - - - - -
3.08**
* 
- - 
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(-
15.99
) 
House 
Price 
- - - - - - - - - - - 11.23*
** 
(11.34) 
- 
CBR/CBT
A 
- - - - - - - - - - - - -0.79 
(-
1.39) 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: the distance to default by measuring how many standard deviations away 
from the default point 
 
Table 2.9: Estimation results of the multivariate model for Blundell-Wignall and 
Roulet (2013)  
 
 All Banks GSIFIs Other Large Banks 
Bank Size 
TA/SysTA 
-4.02** 
(-1.91) 
-4.90*** 
(02.60) 
-3.97** 
(-2.14) 
-5.06*** 
(-4.51) 
-4.94 
(-0.94) 
-3.59 
(-0.63) 
Leverage 
TA/(TE-GW) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.01) 
- -0.02*** 
(-3.34) 
- -0.04** 
(-2.06) 
- 
TeirILeverage 
TierI/RWA 
- 0.95 
(0.31) 
- 4.97* 
(1.76) 
- -2.05 
(-0.55) 
IntBanA/TA 0.53 
(0.40) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.36 
(-0.24) 
-0.56 
(-0.36) 
1.66 
(0.79) 
0.89 
(0.35) 
TD/TA 2.24** 
(2.24) 
1.39 
(1.27) 
3.79*** 
(3.38) 
2.56** 
(2.32) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
WFD/TL -2.67*** 
(-2.67) 
-3.51*** 
(-3.15) 
-2.36 
(-1.59) 
-3.56** 
(-2.13) 
-1.70 
(-1.16) 
-2.47 
(-1.50) 
GMV/TA -2.87*** 
(-2.62) 
-4.03*** 
(-3.68) 
-1.67*** 
(-3.07) 
-2.16*** 
(-7.06) 
-2.76 
(-1.20) 
-3.30 
(-1.44) 
No. 0.01 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.01 
(1.41) 
0.14 
(1.40) 
0.07 
(0.65) 
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XB/TR 0.61 
(0.92) 
0.82 
(1.20) 
3.24*** 
(4.77) 
2.76*** 
(3.84) 
-1.69* 
(-1.75) 
-1.59 
(-1.46) 
Exp/Emp 0.10 
(0.26) 
-0.33 
(-0.82) 
0.04 
(0.07) 
-0.30 
(-0.66) 
0.46 
(0.83) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
Beta -2.40*** 
(-16.31) 
-2.42*** 
(-16.37) 
-2.50*** 
(-15.14) 
-2.54*** 
(-14.79) 
-2.28*** 
(-11.86) 
-2.32*** 
(-11.73) 
House Price 8.89*** 
(9.59) 
10.14*** 
(10.45) 
9.44*** 
(3.06) 
10.78*** 
(3.46) 
10.34*** 
(7.74) 
11.61*** 
(7.91) 
CBR/CBTA -1.03 
(-1.53) 
-0.83 
(-1.22) 
-0.92 
(-1.20) 
-0.75 
(-1.14) 
-0.72 
(-0.65) 
-1.06 
(-0.85) 
Constant 8.19*** 
(3.36) 
10.17*** 
(4.05) 
6.53*** 
(2.81) 
7.85*** 
(3.62) 
1.32 
(0.25) 
5.86 
(1.01) 
Obs 467 418 196 180 271 238 
R2 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.89 0.83 0.84 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: the distance to default by measuring how many standard deviations away 
from the default point 
 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) introduce their systemic measure, Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) in an attempt to predict future systemic risk by quantifying each 
firm’s contribution to future systemic risk based upon a set of current fundamental 
variables such as size, liquidity (mismatch between assets and liabilities), and leverage 
ratio (capital structure). 
Adrian and Brunnermeier collected market equity and quarterly balance sheet 
data for 1226 publically traded financial firms for the period 1986Q1-2010Q4 and 
categorized these firms into four groups including commercial banks, security broker-
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dealers, insurance, and real estate firms. Adrian and Brunnermeier conducted their 
study over quarterly, one year, and two years lagged variables related to firms’ 
characteristics and used Quantile regression to estimate the systemic measure 
‘CoVar.’1 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) built the dependent variable on weekly changes 
in the market value of the total assets.2 Their measure (VaR = CoVaR) is a function of a 
selected set of state variables in order to capture the time-variation in asset returns (the 
change in market-valued assets). In addition, Adrian and Brunnermeier defined 
“ΔCoVaR” as the difference between two CoVar values in order to quantify the financial 
firm’s marginal contribution to systemic risk. The first value is when a firm is under 
distress and the second value when normal conditions existed.3 Their results are shown 
in Table 2.10 below. The table shows that firms with higher leverage, larger size, and 
more maturity mismatch ratios are expected to participate more to the systemic risk in 
one quarter, one year, and two years later at the significant levels of 1 and 5 percent. 
For example, an increase in leverage ratio over a two years period by one unit (i.e. from 
15 to 16), the model finds the systemic risk contribution will increase by 6.76 basis 
points of quarterly asset returns at the level of 5 percent and that translates into $67.6 
billions of systemic risk contribution if the firm’s market-valued asset equals $1 trillion.  
                                                
1 By running 1-% Quantile regressions of financial institutions returns on one-week lag period of 
the selected state variables and compute the predicted value of the regression, they obtained 
VaRi to be included in the regression to predict ΔCoVaRi Where i refers to bank. 
2 The change in market-valued assets (ΔA) = [At- At-1]/ At-1. Where At-1 equal to the multiplication 
of market-valued equity and the ratio of leverage at previous period, and At equal to the 
multiplication of market-valued equity and the ratio of leverage at current period.  ΔA = 
[MVEt*LEVt- MVEt-1*LEVt-1]/[MVEt-1*LEVt-1]. For more details see Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2011). 
3 ΔCoVaRi is the difference between 1%-CoVaRi and the 50%-CoVaRi, where the q-%-CoVaRi 
is the predicted value from a q-%Quantile regression of the financial system asset retunes on 
the institution asset retunes and on the lagged state variables.  
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In addition, Adrian and Brunnermeier show that capital requirement (Tier I capital 
requirement) should not be the same for small and large banks given that both have the 
same leverage ratio. For example, Tier I capital requirement of 7 percent for small 
banks means 1:14 maximum leverage ratio. Therefore, in order to have the same 
ΔCoVaR per unit of capital, larger banks need to reduce their maximum leverage ratio to 
1:10 or equivalently increase their capital requirement to 10 percent. However, the table 
shows little difference in R2 values for each level of significance, the two years lag 
period shows the highest predictive power relative to the other lags.  
Table 2.10: Estimation results for Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) 
 5% ΔCoVaRi 1% ΔCoVaRi 
Lagged 
Variables 
1 
2 Years 
2 
1 Year 
3 
1 Quarter 
4 
2 Years 
5 
1 Year 
6 
1 Quarter 
VaR -0.019 
(0.001) 
-0.012 
(0.001) 
-0.007 
(0.002) 
-0.019 
(0.001) 
-0.014 
(0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.001) 
Log BV 
Equity 
-285.129 
(5.553) 
-279.689 
(5.195) 
-277.861 
(5.105) 
-339.067 
(10.067) 
-334.523 
(9.472) 
-333.238 
(9.372) 
Beta -72.821 
(6.981) 
-92.945 
(6.372) 
-99.459 
(6.220) 
-115.287 
(13.104) 
-142.982 
(12.117) 
-152.082 
(11.837) 
Maturity 
Mismatch 
-13.819 
(7.398) 
-12.059 
(7.166) 
-11.650 
(6.866) 
-46.644 
(14.057) 
-43.797 
(13.901) 
-43.048 
(13.386) 
MV/BV -18.480 
(3.490) 
-17.571 
(3.400) 
-16.672 
(2.988) 
-22.827 
(5.543) 
-21.457 
(5.415) 
-20.084 
(4.856) 
Volatility -11.787 
(2.701) 
-7.516 
(2.686) 
-6.760 
(3.550) 
-5.779 
(5.523) 
-1.747 
(5.512) 
-4.016 
(7.386) 
Leverage -6.765 -7.220 -7.229 -6.924 -6.836 -7.187 
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(1.965) (1.866) (1.811) (3.472) (3.256) (3.105) 
Foreign FE 347.227 
(57.440) 
328.697 
(54.077) 
324.499 
(52.155) 
334.195 
(87.040) 
316.836 
(81.886) 
307.916 
(78.677) 
Insurance 
FE 
91.849 
(25.307) 
91.790 
(24.119) 
95.932 
(23.583) 
25.479 
(45.142) 
36.303 
(42.953) 
48.558 
(41.763) 
Real Estate 
FE 
-68.005 
(32.997) 
-59.171 
(31.808) 
-56.493 
(31.031) 
-318.607 
(64.465) 
-293.028 
(62.064) 
-285.247 
(60.481) 
Broker 
Dealer FE 
-343.445 
(36.363) 
-322.611 
(35.215) 
-304.797 
(34.418) 
-438.256 
(64.008) 
-416.258 
(61.757) 
-398.936 
(59.679) 
Others FE -52.677 
(35.654) 
-35.127 
(33.646) 
-20.558 
(32.380) 
10.638 
(66.097) 
32.362 
(63.482) 
48.961 
(61.396) 
Constant 4419.804 
(126.317) 
4577.975 
(112.639) 
4621.168 
(112.157) 
4922.344 
(230.424) 
5217.287 
(205.215) 
5305.055 
(204.945) 
Obs. 49351 54127 57750 49351 54127 57750 
Adjusted 
R2 
43.63% 43.05% 42.59% 25.78% 25.48% 25.01% 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: weekly changes in market value of the total assets 
 
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) introduced another study 
examining an ex-ante measure for systemic risk called the systemic expected shortfall 
(SES). This study addresses the question pertaining to which institutions contribute 
most to systemic risk by examining cross-sectional data for financial firms.1 In their 
study, Acharya et al. consider financial reports and stock market data. According to 
financial reports, Acharya et al. include standard approximation of financial leverage 
                                                
1 SES is calculated based on the expected amount of capital a bank is short of given that the 
financial system is short of capital as well. In other words, the expected shortfall is the average 
of returns in periods when the firm’s loss exceeds its value-at-risk limits. 
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and a measure of firm size by taking a natural log of book value of assets for each firm 
on a quarterly bases from CRSP-Compustat dataset1. Stock market returns have been 
used as a dependent variable during the crisis period (July, 2007 until December, 
2008), and as an independent variable as a source of calculating the marginal expected 
shortfall variable (MES)2. Acharya et al. used data that consisted of 102 financial firms 
categorized as banks, dealers, insurance, others and real estate firms. Their results 
according to OLS regression and Tobit analysis presented in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 
respectively which indicate that the firms with the highest ratios of leverage and MES 
contributed the most to systemic risk. 
However, Acharya et al.s evidence also suggests that MES and leverage were 
the most significant indicators predicting how much a firm was contributing to systemic 
risk. Acharya et al. also find that other standard measures of firm-risk such as value-at-
risk, volatility and expected loss had no explanatory power, while the covariance of a 
firm’s stock returns with the market scaled by the variance of market returns had only 
modest explanatory power.  
Acharya et al. propose tax policy as a function of the ratios of leverage and MES 
in an attempt to put some regulations in place. This type of tax would contribute to the 
reduction of making risky decisions by managers regarding daily investments, and 
ultimately minimize the probability of firms’ defaults on their debts and the possibility of 
ex-post bailout and spillover effects.  
                                                
1 The standard approximation of financial leverage has been calculated by the use of quasi-
market value of assets instead of book value. The formula that they used is as the following: 
LVGMV = (quasi-market value of assets / market value of equity), similarly LVGMV = ([book value 
of assets – book value of equity + market value of equity]  / [market value of equity])  
2 The marginal expected shortfall calculated as of the average of equity return or loss for a firm 
during the 5% worst days for the market returns in any given year.  
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Table 2.11: Estimation results of OLS regressions for Acharya et al. (2010) 
 Models 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MES   -0.21*** 
(-2.90) 
  -0.15** 
(-2.25) 
 -0.17** 
(-2.08) 
Leverage     -0.04*** 
(-5.73) 
-0.04*** 
(-5.43) 
 -0.03** 
(-2.29) 
ES -0.05 
(-1.14) 
       
Volatility  0.04 
(0.07) 
     -0.07 
(-0.12) 
Beta    -0.29** 
(-2.24) 
    
Log Assets       -0.09*** 
(-4.86) 
-0.05* 
(-1.69) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Constant  
-0.32*** 
(-2.71) 
-0.44*** 
(-3.81) 
-0.13 
(-1.09) 
-0.18 
(-1.42) 
-0.18** 
(-2.5) 
0.02 
(0.20) 
0.61*** 
(2.75) 
0.5 
(1.61) 
Other -0.04 
(-0.33) 
-0.09 
(-0.91) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.012 
(0.12) 
-0.2** 
(-2.44) 
-0.12 
(-1.35) 
-0.25*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.15 
(-1.61) 
Insurance 0.43 
(0.05) 
-0.68 
(-0.08) 
-3.63 
(-0.45) 
-2.95 
(-0.36) 
-8.86 
(-1.19) 
-10.17 
(-1.39) 
-0.09 
(-1.13) 
-0.11 
(-1.55) 
Broker -0.09 
(-0.65) 
-0.16 
(-1.2) 
0.11 
(0.71) 
0.06 
(0.36) 
-0.02 
(-0.18) 
0.16 
(1.19) 
-0.17 
(-1.56) 
0.14 
(1.02) 
No. Obs 102 102 102 102 101 101 101 101 
Pseudo R2 0% -1.36% 6.72% 3.62% 24.27% 27.34% 18.46% 28.02% 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Dependent Variable: Stock market returns during the crisis period (July, 2007 until December, 
2008) 
 
Table 2.12: Estimation results of Tobit analysis for Acharya et al. (2010) 
 Models 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
MES   -0.23*** 
(-2.85) 
  -
0.001** 
(-2.03) 
 -0.001* 
(-1.69) 
Leverage     -0.07*** 
(-6.40) 
-0.06*** 
(-6.14) 
 -
0.05*** 
(-3.18) 
ES -0.05 
(-1.06) 
       
Volatility  0.10 
(0.17) 
     -0.26 
(-0.42) 
Beta    -0.32** 
(-2.24) 
    
Log Assets       -0.12*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.04 
(-1.18) 
Industry 
Dummies 
Constant  
-0.35*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.48*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.14 
(-1.02) 
-0.18 
(-1.29) 
-0.06 
(-0.69) 
0.12 
(1.01) 
0.87*** 
(3.48) 
0.5 
(1.48) 
Other -0.01 
(-0.10) 
-0.08 
(-0.7) 
0.04 
(0.41) 
0.40 
(0.40) 
-0.26*** 
(-2.92) 
-0.18* 
(-1.82) 
-0.28*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.18* 
(-1.82) 
Insurance 0.03 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
-0.11 
(-1.42) 
-0.12 
(-1.58) 
-0.09 
(-1.03) 
-0.13 
(-1.60) 
Broker -0.14 
(-0.87) 
-0.22 
(-1.42) 
0.08 
(0.49) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
-0.07 
(-0.58) 
0.10 
(1.68) 
-0.23* 
(-1.85) 
0.10 
(0.68) 
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No. Obs 102 102 102 102 101 101 101 101 
Pseudo R2 3.95% 2.95% 10.21% 7.49% 43.95% 47.7% 28.87% 49.05% 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: Stock market returns during the crisis period (July, 2007 until December, 
2008) 
 
Andrew Haldane (2012) supports the view that regulation is too complex under 
the supervision of Basel, and concludes that a one factor of leverage ratio is a better 
indicator of crisis than any other Basel’s ratios. Haldane runs logit regression for a set of 
100 of the world’s most complex banks, which had total assets over $100 billions at the 
end of 2006, to confirm that simple un-weighted leverage ratio is significant at the level 
of 1 percent to predict banks’ failure compared to risk-weighted capital ratio. That 
presents a contradiction to the risk-sensitivity doctrine as the complexity in Basel 
framework comes from risk-weighting assets models which intended to predict banks 
failures. The results are shown in Table 2.13. Another source of the complexity is the 
definition of capital. Haldane attempts to show how simple measures of capital can beat 
complex ones, therefore, he examined a set of measures of capital to predict banks’ 
failures. He finds that Core-Tier I and Market simple leverage ratios outperform Core-
Tier I and market risk-based leverage ratios as shown in Table 2.14. In addition, 
Haldane considers a set of predictors of bank failure other than just capital which are 
associated with capital, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity. He finds all 
predictors are correctly signed but not all are significant as shown in Table 2.15.   
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Table 2.13: Estimation results for simple versus complex leverage for Andrew 
Haldane (2012) 
 Models 
Independent 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) 
Leverage Ratio -0.37*** 
(0.13) 
 -0.35*** 
(0.13) 
Risk-based Capital 
Ratio 
 -0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: bank failed or survived the crisis 
 
Table 2.14: Estimation results of measures of capital for Andrew Haldane (2012) 
 Models 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
T1 Risk 
based 
Ratio 
-0.23 
(0.20) 
     0.97 
(1.47) 
T1 
Leverage 
Ratio 
 -0.55*** 
(0.18) 
    -0.48 
(2.04) 
CT1 Risk-
based 
Ratio 
  -0.44* 
(0.25) 
   -1.52 
(1.36) 
CT1 
Leverage 
Ratio 
   -0.70*** 
(0.23) 
  1.22 
(1.99) 
Market 
risk-based 
Ratio 
    -0.08 
(0.05) 
 0.13 
(0.11) 
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Market 
Leverage 
Ratio 
     -0.20*** 
(0.06) 
-0.35* 
(0.20) 
McFadden 
R2 
0.023 0.177 0.070 0.203 0.071 0.216 0.317 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: bank failed or survived the crisis 
 
Table 2.15: Estimation results of other predictors than just capital for Andrew 
Haldane (2012) 
Variables Coefficient 
Risk-based capital Ratio -0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Asset Quality 0.05 
(0.03) 
Efficiency Ratio 0.001 
(0.001) 
Return on Assets -0.16** 
(0.07) 
Liquid Asset Ratio -0.07*** 
(0.01) 
McFadden R2 0.075 
Likelihood Ratio (Chi-square) 261.12*** 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variable: bank failed or survived the crisis 
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Finally, Table 2.16 summarizes some of the similarities and differences among 
studies covered in this dissertation. The relationship between equity and total capital is 
an important factor that most of the literature finds as the most significant to predicting a 
financial crisis. However, different approaches have been conducted to quantify the 
ratio of leverage or equivalently the ratio that defines the relationship between equity 
and total capital. For example, Acharya et al. use market value of equity and quasi-
market value of assets, while Haldane and Demirgus-Kunt et al. use book-valued of 
equity and risk-weighted assets to measure the ratio of leverage. Another area of 
dissimilarities is the way of measuring the crisis incidence variables. Acharya et al. and 
Demirgus-Kunt et al. use the percentage change in stock market prices between the 
maximum and minimum, while Adrian and Brunnermeier use asset returns and Haldane 
use whether a firm went bankrupt during the crisis as a measure of crisis incidence 
variable. In addition, they differ in what methodology should be used and the lag time 
period that needs to be considered across studies. 
 
Table 2.16: Summary of the studies of financial crises using financial ratios 
covered in this dissertation. 
Study Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Sample Methodology 
Edward 
Altman 
(1968)  
“Z-Score 
Model” 
Fail or non-Fail X1 =Working 
capital/total assets 
X2 = retained 
earnings/total assets 
X3 = earnings before 
interest and taxes/total 
assets 
X4 = book value 
Financial 
ratios data 
from 1946 
until 1965 
on a yearly 
basis for a 
sample of 
66 firms 
divided into 
two groups  
Multiple 
discriminant 
statistical 
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equity/book value of 
total liability 
X5 = sales/total assets  
Altman, 
Haldeman, 
and 
Narayanan 
(1977) 
“ZETA 
Model” 
Fail or non-Fail Seven financial ratios 
out of selected 28 
variables: 
X1 = Earnings before 
interest and taxes/total 
asset 
X2 = Stability of 
earnings 
X3 = Earning before 
interest and taxes/total 
interest payments 
X4 = Retained 
earnings/total assets 
X5 = Current assets/ 
current liabilities 
X6 = Common 
equity/total capital 
X7 = Total assets 
  
Financial 
ratios data 
for 111 
firms 
between 
1969 and 
1975 and 
created two 
groups 
including 53 
bankrupt 
firms and 
58 non-
bankrupt 
firms. 
Multiple 
discriminant 
statistical 
Demirgus-
Kunt, 
Detragiache, 
and 
Merrouche in 
2010 
The percent 
change in banks’ 
stock prices 
during the crisis 
periods (2007Q3-
2009Q1) 
X1 = Basel risk-
adjusted ratio 
X2 = Leverage ratio 
X3 = Liquidity 
X4 = Deposits  
X5 = Net Loans 
X6 = Provisions 
X7 = Size 
X8 = MV/BV of Equity 
X9 = Price-earnings 
381 banks 
in 12 
countries 
during the 
period 
2005Q1to 
2009Q1 
OLS cross-
sectional 
analysis 
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X10 = Beta 
Berger and 
Bouwman 
(2009) 
Y1 = Survive the 
banking or 
marketing crisis  
Y2 = The percent 
change in gross 
total assets as a 
measure of 
percent change in 
market share 
Y3 = The percent 
change in liquidity 
creation as a 
measure of 
percent change in 
market share. 
Y4 = The percent 
change in return 
on equity.   
Types of capital ratio, 
log of total assets, and 
a set of control 
variables 
Financial 
data from 
1984Q1 to 
2008Q4 for 
every 
commercial 
and credit 
card bank 
in the US 
(18326 
banks) on a 
quarterly 
basis and 
created 
three 
subsamples 
according 
to the 
banks’ 
sizes 
(small, 
medium, 
and large) 
Logit 
Analysis 
Gregor Weib, 
Denefa 
Bostandzic, 
and Sascha 
Neumann 
(2013) 
The change in 
Lower Tail 
Dependence 
(LTD) and 
Marginal 
Expected Shortfall 
(MES).  
Approaches to 
quantify MES and 
LTD as introduced 
by Acharya et al. 
(2010), and 
Weibet al. (2012) 
respectively. 
A set of control 
variables associated 
with banks’ 
characteristics 
including profitability, 
size, and leverage in 
addition to public 
safety-net guarantees 
and macroeconomic 
fundamentals for all 
countries 
888 banks 
for the 
collapse of 
Lehman 
Brothers. 
They use 
local and 
global 
systemic 
risks over 7 
events 
starting 
from 
Mexico to 
Lehman 
Brothers 
default. 
OLS 
regression.  
Blundell-
Wignall and 
Roulet (2013) 
Distance to 
default (DTD) as 
measured by the 
A set of macro- and 
micro-variables, which 
94 banks 
over the 
period 2004 
Panel 
regression 
(OLS) 
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number of 
standard deviation 
away from the 
default point. 
Default is defined 
as book-valued 
debt ≥ market-
valued assets. 
include: 
X1 = Size 
X2 = Simple leverage 
X3 = Tier I leverage 
X4 = Interbank assets 
X5 = Total debt/total 
asset 
X6 = Gross market 
value/total assets  
to 2011 univariate 
and 
multivariate  
Adrian and 
Brunnermeier 
(2011) 
Systemic risk 
measure ΔCoVaR 
is the difference 
between CoVaR 
conditional on firm 
under distress 
and median state. 
The estimation of 
ΔCoVaR is based 
on weekly 
changes in market 
value of assets.  
X1 = Leverage, 
X2 = Firm’s size  
X3 = Maturity 
mismatch 
X4 = Market-to-book 
X5 = Market beta 
X6 = VaR as F(macro 
control variables) 
X7 = log of book-
valued of equity 
Weekly 
data for the 
changes in 
market 
value of 
assets and 
quarterly 
data for 
financial 
reports 
from 
1986Q1-
2010Q4 for 
all publicly 
traded 
financial 
institutions. 
Quantile and 
panel 
regressions.  
Acharya, 
Pedersen, 
Philippon, 
and 
Richardson 
(2010) 
Y1 = The capital 
shortfalls at large 
firms during the 
crisis measured 
by the stress test 
Y2 = The drop in 
equity values of 
large firms during 
the crisis. (Jul 
2007 – Dec 2008) 
Y3 = The increase 
in credit risk 
estimated from 
CDS returns of 
X1 = Leverage ratio 
X2 = Marginal 
expected shortfall 
X3 = Expected 
shortfall 
X4 = Beta 
X5 = log Assets 
X6 = Volatility 
102 
financial 
firms 
OLS 
regression, 
and Tobit 
regression 
analysis 
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large firms during 
the crisis. 
Andrew 
Haldane 
(2012) 
Failed and 
surviving 
X1 = Simple leverage 
X2 = Tier I risk-based 
leverage 
X3 = Asset quality  
X4 = Efficiency ratio 
X5 = Return on assets 
X6 = Liquidity asset 
ratio 
A set of 100 
of the 
world’s 
most 
complex 
banks, 
which had 
total assets 
over 100 
billions at 
the end of 
2006 
Logit 
regression 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
3.1 RESEARCH DESGIN 
We conducted our research in two parts. Initially, we use a correlational 
quantitative design using structural equation modeling (SEM) to analyze historical data 
and test a theoretical model that presents our view about the relationships between 
independent and dependent variables to examine if it fits the data. This is especially 
important because correlational and historical data do not allow for hypothesis testing or 
causal inference due to a lack of experimental design. However, a theoretical model can 
be constructed for this data and thus, a hypothesis can be tested.  
Subsequently, we use multivariable fractional polynomial estimation technique 
(MFP) to overcome the inadequacy of linear models and take advantage of its features 
of including all interested variables "full model" and the implementation of a backward 
elimination process. We use MFP to test the relationships between continuous 
covariates and outcomes as introduced by (Royston, 1994) and modified by (Sauerbrei, 
1999). 
3.2 RATIONALE FOR A QUANTITATIVE FRAMEWORK  
In the first part of this analysis, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) to test 
our exploratory hypothetical model that explains the relationships between the financial 
statement items in order to predict the change of stock market prices. A hypothetical 
causal model is first operationalized to test the proposed model for significant 
relationships between variables using the suggested theory and concepts. Employing 
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the SEM technique achieves this task by testing the data against the best-fit model 
(Bollen, 1993). 
Additionally, SEM technique requires the construction of endogenous and 
exogenous variables in order to define the relationship between those variables. In 
regression models, the dependent variable (DV) regresses on independent variable (IV) 
which means the IV predicts DV. However, with SEM, endogenous variables can only 
regress upon exogenous variables, while exogenous variables cannot regress on 
endogenous variables. Endogenous variables can also be both dependent and 
independent variables at the same time which makes SEM technique more general than 
regression. 
Two types of analyses are conducted at the same time using SEM technique not 
available with other techniques including path and factor analysis. The first analysis 
shows how likely the causal relationships are between endogenous and exogenous 
variables which presents the similarity between SEM and path analyses. The second 
analysis shows the relationships between unobserved variables and their indicators 
which presents the similarity between SEM and factor analyses. 
In the second part of the analysis, we use fractional polynomials framework (FP) 
to overcome the weaknesses of linear and quadratic functions as both may produce 
misleading conclusions if they are not the proper functions. We believe that an 
intermediate relationship exists between polynomials and non-linear curves in between 
continuous covariates. 
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One advantage of multivariable fractional polynomials (MFP) algorithm technique 
is that is combines both backward elimination and FP function selection in a systematic 
way for continuous covariates. The MFP model starts with a full model (over-fitting). 
However, a sequence of tests will be conducted in order to keep type I error at the 
chosen level of significance (i.e., 0.05) in order to reduce the over-fitting problem. The 
first test decides whether to include the continuous covariates by testing FP2 against 
the null model, which is not to include them. The covariate will be included if it is 
significant. Then the technique moves on to the nonlinearity test where FP2 is tested 
against a straight line.  The MFP algorithm keeps the techniques of selection and 
transformation for each covariate and adjusts other covariates until there are no more 
covariates to exclude or change. 
3.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
In this dissertation, we empirically investigate what variables from a firm's 
financial statement significantly predict an individual firm's vulnerability to a financial 
crisis? In order to answer this question, this analysis begins by selecting a variety of 
variables from a firm's financial statement associated with the firm's performance, 
profitability and liquidity. Second, an investigation will be carried out using Structural 
Equation Modeling and Multivariable Fractional Polynomials testing the effects of those 
variables on two dependent variable measures for the percentage of change in stock 
market price over varying time periods.  
H1Null: There is no relationship over varying time lengths between independent 
variables from financial statements and the dependent variables. 
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• Dependent Variables: two different measures for the percentage change of stock 
market price. 
• Predictor Variables or Mediating Variables: average level or accumulated time-
weighted rate of change of financial statements variables. 
• Statistical Analysis: Structural Equation Modeling and Multivariable Fractional 
Polynomials. 
3.4 POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
The population included in this study consists of the financial industry which, in 
2004, represented 20 percent of the market capitalization of the S&P 500 in the United 
States.1 This active industry serves as the intermediary between lenders and borrowers 
of capital or cash. In fact, the financial industry is the main source of liquidity for both 
financial and real economies. The financial market includes commercial banks, 
investment banks, insurance companies, real estate, and others. 
According to Acharya et al. (2010) a list of 102 financial firms was selected out of 
1226 financial institutions whose market capitalization exceeded $5 billion in 2007. 
Firms were then categorized into four groups including Depository, Non-Depository, 
Insurance, and Broker-Dealer firms.2 In this study, at least seven financial institutions 
from each category were randomly chosen according to data availability and fewer 
missing values if necessarily for targeted independent variables to end up with 52 
financial firms as our sample. In this sample, each category is illustrated with the 
following proportions: 93 percent depository institutions including Bank of America and 
                                                
1 See investor.com (2004) “The Mistakes of Our Grandparents” 
2 For more details see Acharya et al. (2010)  
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Citigroup (hereafter called Banks); 33 percent non-depository institutions including 
Federal National Mortgage and Blackrock (hereafter called Others); 25 percent of 
insurance institutions including AIG and Berkshire (hereafter called Insurances); and 70 
percent broker-dealer institutions including Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers 
(hereafter called Brokers). Table 3.1 in Appendix A shows the list of the U.S. financial 
institutions used in this dissertation. 
In this study, we use quarterly adjusted stock market prices and financial 
statement items data on a quarterly basis since it is the shortest period for publicly 
traded financial institutions to report on these statements to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). We collected data from Bloomberg terminal at Claremont 
Graduate University for the period between the third quarter of 2002 and the fourth 
quarter of 2011.  
The descriptive statistics for each category with respect to their market 
capitalization over the period before the recent crash that started in the third quarter of 
2007 are shown in Table 3.2 below. In addition, the correlation figures between the 
changes of stock prices for financial firms and change of market index price for each 
category over varying periods are shown in Table 3.3 below. The strongest correlation 
exists between brokers and benchmark (S&P) before and after the crisis (0.65 and 0.86 
respectively) illustrating how volatile this group was relative to the rest. The highest 
increased percentage in correlation coefficients before and after the crisis exists 
between others and benchmark, while the next highest increase exists between brokers 
and benchmark (66 percent and 32 percent, respectively). This also reflects how 
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perceptive the public becomes toward financial institutions after the crisis as all 
categories ended up more correlated with the index than before the crisis.  
 
 
Table 3.2: This table shows the descriptive statistics for each category with respect to 
their market capitalization over the pre-crisis period from 2002q3 to 2007q3. 
Category N Mean SD Min Max 
Banks 550 36,907 57,744.89 1,384.779 273,598.1 
Others 161 25,161.87 22,212.13 771.3664 72,808.2 
Insurances 189 45,073.41 50,865.87 1,543.555 183,394.2 
Brokers 147 31,977.5 23,749.62 1,505.643 94,264.58 
 
 
Table 3.3: This table shows the correlation coefficients between the changes of stock 
market prices of financial institutions and the change of market index price (S&P 500) 
by category over different time periods.  
Category Before 2007q3 2007q3—2009q1 After 2009q1 
Banks .50 .21 .58 
Others .33 .39 .55 
Insurances .52 .43 .57 
Brokers .65 .32 .86 
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3.5 OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES 
3.5.1 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
We use the percent change of quarterly adjusted stock market prices during the 
crisis to measure the dependent variable because these prices are available and more 
actively traded than other measures such as bonds’ prices or credit default swaps. 
Moreover, these prices are used to measure how public evaluates an individual firm 
according to its performance, future growth, and ability to generate profits. Since there 
is no one right way to measure the change of stock market prices, we operationalize the 
dependent variable in two different methods. The Table in Appendix B shows the list of 
all variables used in this dissertation and their descriptions. 
THE PERCENT CHANGE IN STOCK MARKET PRICE BETWEEN MAXIMUM AND 
MINIMUM POINTS (Y1) 
 This research attempts to identify variables that could have better predicted 
which financial institutions would suffer the greatest negative impact as a result of the 
2008 financial crisis. We first compute the percent change of stock market price 
between the maximum and minimum points during the systemic event in 2008. We 
define third quarter of 2007 as the peak point and first quarter of 2009 as the lowest 
point since it has been marked by S&P 500 index price (the benchmark of financial 
market).1 Figure 3.1 shows the performance of benchmark stock market price and 
Figure 3.2 shows the accumulative returns on firm’s stock market price over the period 
of this this study. 
                                                
1 Demirgus-Kunt et al. (2010) used the same maximum and minimum points to calculate the 
percent change of stock market prices as the dependent variable.  
 52 
The vulnerability of a firm is measured by how much its stock market price 
dropped during the crisis. Figure 3.3 shows the percent drop or rise of stock market 
price for each financial institution during the systemic crisis by suing the first measure of 
stock market effects of such crisis. Firms that went bankrupt or were acquired by others 
report 100 percent drop of stock price proved as the most vulnerable firms to the crisis, 
for example: WB, WAMUQ, UB, NCC, MER, LEHMQ, and CBH. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The performance of quarterly adjusted benchmark’s stock market 
price.  
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Figure 3.2: The accumulated return on stock market price. 
 
Figure 3.3: The percent change in stock market price between the maximum and 
minimum points during the systemic crisis in 2008. 
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THE PERCENT CHANGE IN STOCK MARKET PRICE BETWEEN AVERAGE-
MAXIMUM AND -MINIMUM POINTS (Y2) 
 We compute the percent change in stock market price between the average 
maximum and minimum point during the financial crisis as a second method in order to 
overcome outlier effects in the first measure. We do this by taking the average-
maximum over three quarters (2007q3 – 2008q1) and the average-minimum over three 
quarters (2008q3 – 2009q1) because as mentioned earlier, the peak occurred during 
the third quarter of 2007 and the lowest point occurred during the first quarter of 2009. 
Figure 3.4 below shows the weakness of this method as if a firm showed positive 
change in stock price for some quarters even though it went bankrupt later on that leads 
to a positive result such as that with UB. Firms that went bankrupt or were acquired by 
others reported as 100 percent drop in stock market price proved as the most 
vulnerable firms to the crisis, for example: WAMUQ, LEHMQ, and CBH. 
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Figure 3.4: The percent change in stock market price between the average 
maximum and average minimum points during the systemic crisis in 2008.  
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three different lags. Second, we calculated the accumulated time-weighted rate of 
change for each of the ratios identified in this study over the same lags. The purpose of 
these different approaches and lags is to examine which set has more predictive power.  
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE RATIO (Lev) 
Companies will often raise debt to support their growth indicated as assets 
growth. Financial leverage ratio is used to illustrate the firm’s capital structure and to 
determine to what extent a company can use debt relative to its equity. The assumption 
here is that the greater the stability of financial market and company earnings, the more 
the company can undertake risk associated with high financial leverage. On the other 
hand, an indication of deleveraging might be considered a red flag to investors who 
require growth in their companies because that shows the company is selling its assets 
to meet its obligations. In short, the ratio of financial leverage has been used as a 
measure of firm’s capital structure.  
Scholarly literature shows different views about the effects of leverage ratio on 
firms’ contribution to the crises. For example, previous scholars have shown that 
leverage ratios can lead to loans’ quality and provide banks with the necessary liquidity 
which will lead to lower default rates and lower risk.1 Conversely, current scholars argue 
that higher leverage would increase the systemic risk in the financial industry.2 
Many methods can be used to calculate leverage ratios. The first and most 
common method divides the total book-valued of assets by total book-valued of equity 
which is known as the equity multiplier as shown in Adrian and Brunnermeire (2011). In 
                                                
1 See Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001). 
2 See Acharya et al. (2010), Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Brunnermeire et al (2012). 
 57 
this instance, the lower the ratio, the better the firm’s position. Another method is to use 
market-valued of equity instead of book-valued of equity in the denominator, while 
quasi-market value of assets is used instead of book-valued of assets in the numerator 
as illustrated in Acharya et al. (2010). Others use risk-weighted assets instead of un-
weighted assets or use both as control variables as shown in Demirgus-Kunt et al. 
(2010). In this dissertation, leverage ratio is computed as the total short- and long-term 
debts scaled by total capital which includes both short- and long-term debts and total 
equity as shown below. Thus, a firm that reports a huge loss would show lower value of 
equity via retained earnings factor and consequently lower value in the denominator to 
increase the leverage ratio.  
Total Debt / Total Capital = 
(Current Liability + Long Term Debt) / (Current Liability + Long Term Debt + Equity)  
Figure 3.5a shows firms’ average levels of financial leverage ratio over eight 
quarters lag pre-crisis event in 2007q3. Figure 3.5a shows a group of financial 
institutions that went bankrupt or acquired by others located on top of the list such as 
WU, MS, LEHMQ, and MER. Figure 3.5b shows firm’s accumulated change of leverage 
ratio over eight quarters pre-crisis event. Figure 3.5b shows what both positive and 
negative rates of change have upon ‘firms went bankrupt’. 
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Figure 3.5a: Firms’ average levels of financial leverage ratio.  
 
Figure 3.5b: Firm’s accumulated rate of change of leverage ratio. 
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CURRENT RATIO (CR) 
In essence, a current ratio compares firms’ current assets relative to its current 
liabilities. The current ratio shows firms’ ability to pay back short-term liabilities which 
require payment within one year using short-term assets (cash, cash equivalent, and 
short-term investment). The higher the current ratio, the more capable the company is 
to meet its obligations. However, even though a ratio under one does not necessarily 
mean that a company will go bankrupt due to the many ways that a company can 
access capital via financing, it does suggest that a company would be unable to pay off 
its obligation and shows that it is not in good financial health.  
Scholars have used different measures of liquidity. For example, Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) use the balance between assets and liability as a measure of each 
firm’s ability to pay their obligations, while other scholars use measures such as interest 
coverage ratio or acid cash ratio. In this dissertation, liquidity is computed as the total 
current assets scaled by total current liabilities as shown below.  
CR = (Current Asset) / (Current Liability) 
Figure 3.6a shows the firms’ average levels of current ratio over eight quarters 
pre-crisis event in 2007q3. However, the average level’s method shows that 'firms went 
bankrupt' distributed all over, while the use of accumulative change of current ratio 
method shows that firms went bankrupt grouped in the negative side as shown in Figure 
3.6b.  
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Figure 3.6a: Firms’ average levels of current ratio.  
 
Figure 3.6b: Firm’s accumulated rate of change of current ratio. 
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ASSET TURNOVER RATIO (ATR) 
Asset turnover ratio measures how efficiently a firm is at using its assets to 
generate revenues regardless of size. The higher the ratio, the more efficient the firm is. 
Asset turnover ratio also resolves a major shortcoming of return on equity (ROE) as the 
latter ratio does not tell if a company has excessive debt or uses debt to drive returns. 
However, asset turnover ratio does include liabilities like debt in their assets and 
therefore, the lower the debt, the higher the ATR is.  
ATR = (Revenue) / (Average Asset) 
Figure 3.7a shows that most of ‘firms went bankrupt’ or ‘severely damaged by the 
crisis’ positioned at lower ratios and more than 35 financial firms have the average level 
of asset turnover ratio below 0.05 which means that a firm can generate only 0.05 from 
using each unit of asset. However, the average level’s method shows that ‘firms went 
bankrupt’ distributed at the bottom of the previous figure all over, while the use of 
accumulative change of asset turnover ratio method shows that ‘firms severely 
damaged by the crisis’ distributed on both directions as shown in Figure 3.7b.  
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Figure 3.7a: Firms’ average levels of asset turnover ratio.  
 
Figure 3.7b: Firm’s accumulated rate of change of asset turnover ratio. 
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RETURN ON ASSET (ROA) 
Return on assets ratio measures how efficiently a company can generate profit 
from its assets regardless of its size. The higher the ratio, the more efficient the firm and 
better performance it has. Also, return on assets resolves the weakening of return on 
equity as does asset turnover ratio.  
ROA = (Net Income) / (Average Asset) 
Figure 3.8a shows the firms’ average levels of return on asset ratio over eight 
quarters pre-crisis event in 2007q3, while Figure 3.8b shows the firms’ accumulative 
change of return on asset ratio. 
Figure 3.8a: Firms’ average levels of return on asset ratio.  
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Figure 3.8b: Firm’s accumulated rate of change of return on asset ratio. 
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operating cash ratio and Figure 3.9b shows the accumulative change of operating cash 
flow ratio. 
OCF = (Operating Cash Flow) / (Average Asset) 
FINANCING CASH FLOW RATIO (FCF) 
Positive financing cash flow ratio shows to what extent a firm depends on rising 
debt or issuing more stocks relative to the average asset over a certain period. On the 
other hand, negative financing cash flow ratio shows to what extent a firm pays back its 
debt or buys back its shares or paying dividends. Figure 3.10 shows the firms’ average 
levels of financing cash flow ratio.  
FCF = (Financing Cash Flow) / (Average Asset) 
INVESTING CASH FLOW RATIO (ICF) 
Positive investing cash flow ratio shows to what extent a firm depends on 
generating cash by selling its assets. On the other hand, negative investing cash flow 
ratio shows to what extent a firm invests by buying new assets. In general, a firm that 
generates cash flows only by selling its assets (obtaining cash flow from investing 
activities) or by issuing more shares debts (obtaining cash flows from financing 
activities) cannot keep that up for very long. Figure 3.11 shows the firms’ average levels 
of investing cash flow ratio.   
ICF = (Investing Cash Flow) / (Average Asset) 
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Figure 3.9a: Firms’ average levels of operating cash flow ratio.  
 
Figure 3.9b: Firm’s accumulated rate of change of operating cash flow ratio. 
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Figure 3.10: Firms’ average levels of financing cash flow ratio.  
 
Figure 3.11: Firms’ average levels of investing cash flow ratio.  
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FIRM SIZE (A) 
A firm’s size as presented via taking the natural log of total book-valued assets 
has a major role in most of the literature to measure a bank’s contribution to the 
systemic crisis. Many scholars view larger banks as more connected to other financial 
firms than smaller banks. Such high interconnectedness among large banks generated 
the term "Too Big to Fail" (TBTF). One side finds that larger banks have the ability to 
increase their profits and as a result, also have the ability to diversity their risks ending 
up minimizing those banks' contribution to such systemic risk.1 The other side finds 
large banks implied insurance via TBTF policy which allows those banks' managers to 
take high investment risks in order to gain more profits. This in turn lead into those 
banks making a higher contribution to systemic risk.2 Therefore, the inclusion of this 
variable allows examining the importance of the firm’s size to predict the stock market 
effects of a systemic crisis. Figure 3.12 shows the firms’ sizes starting from the largest. 
A = log (Total Asset in Book Value) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 See Diamond (1984), Freixas and Rochet (2008), Matutes and Vives (2000), and Boyd et al 
(2004). 
2 See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2006) and Brunnermeire et al. (2012). 
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Figure 3.12: Firms’ natural log of total book-valued assets (size).  
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to contribute more to systemic risk. Figure 3.13a shows the average level of short- and 
long-term investment assets ratio and Figure 3.13b shows the accumulative change of 
short- and long-term investment assets ratio. 
A2a = (Short & Long Term Investment Asset) / (Total Asset) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13a: Firms’ average levels of short- & long-term investment assets ratio.  
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Figure 3.13b: Firms’ accumulated rate of change of short- & long-term investment 
assets ratio.  
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decisions regarding their expectations about the future of the financial positions, 
performances, and ability of an individual firm to generate profit in the future.  
In the U.S., all financial institutions need to report to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) on a quarterly and annual basis and are seized particularly in the 
post-Enron era. Therefore, CEOs are personally liable for the accuracy of these reports. 
For example, the former CEO “Bernie Ebbers” of World.Com was sentenced for 25 
years behind bars for overstating revenues over a period of many years.  
3.6.2 DATA PROBLEMS 
One of the problems faced in this analysis is multicolinearity among independent 
variables (see Table 3.4 in Appendix C). Many researchers attempt to drop one or more 
independent variables when this issue arises to overcome biased estimates. 
Consequently, we would lose information relevant to variables which would result in a 
similar situation of biased estimates. Also, methods to solve problems with 
multicolinearity can create more serious problems, and a variance inflation factor (VIF) 
of 40 or more does not by itself lower the results of the regression analyses (O'Brien, 
2007). 
When a fractional polynomials model is generated, it causes a special type of 
multicolinearity that typically does not result in reduction of the predictive power or the 
reliability of models as a whole and it only affects predictions regarding individual 
predictor. Therefore, the rise of multicolinearity does not affect the effectiveness of the 
fitted model when conducted with new data, which follows the same pattern as the old 
data (Gujarati, 2002). 
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3.6.3 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Tables 3.5 in Appendix C shows the descriptive statistics of both dependent 
variable that have been used in this study and shows that both outcomes are normally 
distributed. Table 3.6 in Appendix C summarizes the distribution of independent 
variables calculated by the method of average levels, while the other variables 
calculated by the accumulative change are shown in Table 3.7 in the same Appendix. 
We use different logarithmic functions to transform highly skewed data particularly when 
conducting the analysis based on Structural Equation Modeling in order to make the 
data more symmetrical and normally distributed. Highly skewed variables on the right 
are associated with average level of asset turnover, return on asset, and current ratios, 
whereas highly skewed variables on the left are associated with financial leverage and 
short- and long-term investment assets.  
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4 EMPERICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 
4.1 ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING 
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) is a very broad term that includes many 
different types of analyses. We use a type of structural equation model called 'path 
analysis' that allows a variable to be a dependent variable in one analysis and an 
independent variable in another called a mediating' or 'intervening' variable. Path 
analysis uses the general linear modeling (GLM) approach to estimate non-recursive 
models, models with measurement error, and models with latent (unobserved) 
variables.  
A series of models was created to examine whether or not our hypothetical view 
about the relationships between variables was adequate to explain the data. In the final 
part of this section, we will test the best fit model over varying lag periods. The models 
are designed in this study to further investigate the expected interactions between 
financial leverage ratio and other independent variables and to test it against other 
models which could serve as alternative explanations for the data. The models are 
hierarchical which means that the first model is a baseline model. Elements are then 
added and goodness of fit indices are examined to test whether each model is an 
acceptable fit. The fit indices that will be examined include the Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI), which should carry a value that is close to one and not lower than .93 for an 
acceptable fit. The Tucker Lewis Index (TLI) will also be used which also be close to 
one, not lower than 0.90 for an acceptable fit, and higher than 0.95 for a good fit 
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(Bentler, 1990).1 The root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) will be also 
examined and should have a value that is lower than .08 for an acceptable fit and a 
value that is less than .05 for a good fit. The standardized root mean squared residual 
(SRMR) value should be less than .05, and the chi square and associated p- value 
should be non-significant meaning that the data estimates created from the model are 
not significantly different than the observed data.2  
The first set of models (SEM1) examines the effect of both assets turnover ratio 
and time-weighted rate of change of current ratio upon both average level and 
accumulated rate of change of financial leverage ratios in order to predict changes in 
stock market prices (%Y1 and %Y2) over three different lags. The second set of models 
(SEM2) tests the same relationships as those in the first set (SEM1) but adding another 
predictor variable, the natural log of firm’s asset (logA). The third set of models (SEM3) 
tests the same relationships as in the first set (SEM1) but adding a new mediator 
variable to the model, the time-weighted rate of change of short- and long-term 
investment asset ratio to mediate the effect of leverage ratio. These hypothetical views 
are shown in Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 in Appendix D respectively.  
4.2 MODEL COMPARISONS 
As mentioned previously, these three sets of models (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) 
are created to test our hypothetical view for the relationships between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables over varying lags to test whether it fits the data.   
                                                
1 See Bentler (1990) for more details. 
2 See Browne and Cudeck (1993) for more details.  
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The first set of models (SEM1) shows poor results according to the criteria used 
to predict Y1, but showed an acceptable fit when predicting Y2 over 4 and 8 quarters 
lag only. The second hypothetical view represented in SEM2 showed an improvement 
relative to SEM1. However, it showed the same results regarding the second outcome 
Y2 over 4 and 8 quarters lag as found in SEM1. It shows an additional good-fit model 
predicting the first outcome Y1 over 8 quarters lag. Finally, the SEM3 showed the best-
fit set among all the models. However, it showed the same results regarding the second 
outcome Y2 as previously mention in SEM1 and SEM2. It shows a good fit result for 
another two models predicting the first outcome Y1 over 4 and 8 quarters lag. While the 
result for the model run over 4 quarters lag shows an acceptable fit (RMSEA=0.080), 
the model run over 8 quarters lag shows a good fit results for the data. Therefore, the 
model from the set SEM3 which run over 8 quarters lag to predict the first outcome Y1 
is the best-fit model among all models in all sets as it meets all criteria χ2 =8.969, the 
associated p-value is equal to 0.345, RMSEA= 0.048 which is below the 0.05 level, and 
the probability of getting RMSEA significant is 0.441. In addition, it has the closest 
values to the value of one for CFI=0.987 and TLI=0.978, and the coefficient of 
determination CD=0.677. The fit indices results regarding the three sets of models 
(SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) are shown in Table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 in Appendix D 
respectively. In addition, the standardized coefficients results for the models (SEM1-Y1, 
SEM1-Y2, SEM2-Y1, SEM2-Y2, SEM3-Y1, and SEM3-Y2) are shown in Tables 4.4, 
4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 in Appendix D respectively.   
We find that model SEM3-8Q to be the best-fit model according to the 
aforementioned criteria. Therefore, a test for its plausibility and expected relationships 
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between the independent and dependent variables needs to take a place. First, there 
are variables that have direct effects on the outcome such as asset turn over, 
accumulated rate of change of current ratio, and accumulated rate of change of short- 
and long-term investment assets, while variables such as average level of leverage and 
its accumulated rate of change have indirect effect on the outcome. Table 4.8 shows the 
standardized coefficients results regarding to this model (SEM3-8Q) which predicts the 
first outcome Y1 based on the third hypothetical view over an eight quarters lag. For 
example, the coefficient –0.036 shows the goodness of the fit for the best possible 
linear relationship between (ATR-0.5) and (Y1) when holding other variables constant. 
This is a significant negative relationship at a level of α = 0.01. Thus, if asset turnover 
(ATR) increases, then (ATR-0.5) will decrease and (Y1) will increase as well which states 
a positive relationship between ATR and Y1 similar to what we expected. This means 
that there would be a -0.036 unit change in Y1 per one standard deviation change in 
(ATR-0.5). In other words, if the inverse square root of asset turnover ratio increases by 
one standard deviation (mean level=7.336 and 1SD=3.373), the asset turnover ratio will 
decrease by 53.07 percent from 0.185 to 0.0087, and a more than average decline in 
stock market price as well by 11.02 percent. But if the inverse square root of asset 
turnover ratio decreases by one standard deviation, the asset turnover ratio will rise by 
242.6 percent from 0.0185 to 0.0636, and a less than average decline in stock price by 
11.02 percent as well. This illustrates how sensitive the change in stock price to a firm’s 
inability to generate revenue from its assets in an efficient way. This is the economic 
interpretation of the existence of the inverse square root of asset turnover ratio. Figure 
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4.4 in Appendix D shows the relationship between asset turnover ratio and predicted 
change of stock market price.   
The relationship between the accumulated rate of change in short- and long-term 
assets (rrA2) and outcome (Y1) was not significant. A negative sign that shows an 
increase in this fraction of asset over a period of many years has a negative impact on 
the change in stock price. The third direct impact on the outcome comes from the 
accumulated rate of change of current ratio (rrCR). It shows a significant positive 
relationship at the level of 0.05 between the ratio of current asset to current liability with 
(Y1), and the coefficient of 0.30 shows the goodness of the fit for the best possible 
linear relationship between the two variables.  When current asset grows faster than 
current liability over many years, the model predicts a less decline than average in stock 
market price. For example, holding all other ratios unchanged, if this ratio (rrCR) 
increases or decreases by one standard deviation from mean level from -0.037 to 0.19 
or -0.264 (mean level=-0.0374 and 1SD=0.227), the model predicts a less or more 
decline than average in stock price by the same percent (i.e. 9.18 percent) respectively. 
In short, if a firm’s current asset (cash or liquid asset that can be transferred into cash) 
grows at a rate faster than that of its current liability (short-term debts), the model 
predicts a lower decline than average in stock market price. In Appendix D, Figure 4.5 
shows the relationship between the growth of short- and long-term investment assets 
and predicted change in stock market price, and Figure 4.6 shows the relationship 
between the growth of current ratios and predicted change in stock market price. 
When examining the predictor variables that have indirect effects, cubed financial 
leverage ratio has a positive significant relationship with the inverse square root of ATR 
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at α = 0.001 level of significance. The coefficient value 0.62 shows the goodness of fit 
for the best possible linear relationship between (L3) and (ATR-0.5). A small increase in 
financial leverage ratio would be amplified by the cubed function to reflect its positive 
significant effect on (ATR-0.5) and its indirect negative effect on (Y1) through (ATR-0.5). If 
the cubed average level of leverage ratio over two years increases by one standard 
deviation, it would cause (ATR0.5) to increase by 0.62 per unit changed. In addition, to 
calculate the indirect effect of the predictor variable (L3) on the outcome (Y1), we need 
to multiply the two path coefficients (0.62*-0.036) to get (- 0.223). Thus, if cubed 
financial leverage ratio increases or decreases by one standard deviation, 
(mean=0.6246, 1SD=0.2619) it would cause the stock market price to decline more or 
less than average by 22.3 percent per unit respectively. In financial leverage terms, it is 
equivalent to an increase of financial leverage ratio from 0.854 to 0.96 (increased by 
12.38 percent) or a decrease from 0.854 to 0.71 (decreased by 16.57 percent) for that 
similar change of stock market price. In other words, an individual firm that raises debts 
relative to equity ratio more often than mean level (for example higher by 12.38 percent) 
would expect to experience a more decline than average in stock price by 6.8 percent 
should a crisis occurs. A firm would expect to see a lower than average drop in stock 
market price by the same amount (i.e., 6.8 percent) if that firm has leverage ratio lower 
than a mean level of 16.57 percent. This translates the inclusion of cubed function of 
financial leverage. A small increase in financial leverage causes a higher drop of stock 
market price whereas a larger decrease in leverage is required to have the same impact 
on stock price on the opposite direction. In Appendix D, Figure 4.7 shows the 
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relationship between the average level of leverage ratio and predicted change of stock 
market price.  
The second predictor variable is the accumulated rate of change of financial 
leverage ratio (rrL). It shows two significant relationships with two other mediating 
variables. The first relationship is a positive significant relationship between (rrLev) and 
(rrA2a) at α = 0.001 level of significance and the coefficient 0.61 shows the goodness of 
the fit for the best possible linear relationship between (rrL) and (rrA2). If the 
accumulated rate of change of leverage increases by one standard deviation, the 
accumulated rate of change of this fraction of assets would increase by 0.61 per unit. 
The second relationship is between (rrLev) and (rrCR) which is a negative significant 
relationship at α = 0.001 level of significance. The coefficient -0.522 shows the 
goodness of the fit for the best possible linear relationship between (rrLev) and (rrCR). If 
the accumulated rate of change of leverage increases by one standard deviation, the 
accumulated rate of change of this current ratio would decline by -0.522 per unit. In 
order to calculate the total indirect effect of accumulated rate of change of leverage on 
the outcome Y1, we need to add both multiplications of the two path coefficients (0.61*-
0.19 + -0.52*0.30) to get -0.27. In short, an institution that experiences growth in 
leverage ratio over two years higher than mean level by one standard deviation would 
expect a more than average decline in stock market price by 8.26 percent. However, if it 
is lower than a mean level by one standard deviation, it would expect a less than 
average decline in stock market price by the same amount. In Appendix D, Figure 4.8 
shows the relationship between the accumulative change of leverage ratio and 
predicted change in stock market price, and Table 4.10 shows mean values for each 
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financial ratio and predicted change in stock market price from average according to an 
increase or a decrease by one standard deviation for each. 
Finally, the Table 5.8 shows the correlation coefficient (standardized covariance) 
between both predictor variables; the average level of financial leverage and its 
accumulated rate of change to equal 0.33 which indicates the goodness of the fit for the 
best possible linear relationship between the two variables. An individual firm that 
accumulates debts at rate faster than raising equity tends to have higher average level 
of financial leverage 33 percent of the time.  
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5 EMPERICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON MULTIVARIABLE FRACTIONAL 
POLYNOMIALS 
5.1 ANALYSIS AND PROCESSING  
A series of models are created by the use of Multivariable Fractional Polynomial 
methods (MFP) over varying lags to examine which best-fit model illustrates the data 
and tests the relationships between the outcome and continuous covariates as 
introduced by Royston and Altman (1994) and modified by Sauerbrei and Royston 
(1999). Typically, the multivariable fractional polynomial (MFP) starts with a full model 
that includes all predictor variables that of our interest to investigate. Consequently, 
MFP technique run backwards eliminates and systematically transforms continuous 
covariates throughout repeated cycle processes to test against other models.  
Model 1 (MFP4QY1) is used to examine the relationships between financial 
ratios and the first outcome (Y1), while the same test is applied with the second 
outcome (Y2) in model 4 (MFP4QY2) over four quarters lag. Models 2 (MFP8QY1) and 
5 (MFP8QY2) test the same relationships over eight quarters lag, and models 3 
(MFP12QY1) and 6 (MFP12QY2) over twelve quarters lag.  
Different criteria to test the goodness of fit for each subsequent model are carried 
out. The most importantly criterion is the coefficient of determination (R2) in conjunction 
with other criteria including Root MSE, the F statistic and associated p-values. Second, 
the normality test carries through the command “swilk” which performs the test of 
“Shapiro Wilk” and the associated p-value. This test is based upon the pre-assumption 
that the residual is normally distributed. If it becomes significant at a certain level (i.e. 
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0.05), we can reject the null hypothesis that the residual is normally distributed. Third, 
the Breusch-Pagan and White’s Test are used to test for heteroskedasicity which tests 
the null hypothesis that the variance of the residual is constant and identical. Therefore, 
if the associated p-values are insignificant at level 0.05, then we accept the null 
hypothesis rather than rejecting that the variance is homogenous. 
In addition, we use two different measures for the purpose of analyzing and 
testing the model specification errors, both which should indicate insignificant p-values 
in order to accept the model. Otherwise the model needs to be reconsidered. The first 
test is carried out by the command ‘linktest’ which refits the model using two new 
variables. The variable of prediction (_hat) and its associated p-value need to be 
significant and the variable of squared prediction (_hatsq) and its associated p-value 
should be insignificant if the model is specified correctly. The second test is carried out 
by the command “ovtest.” It performs a regression specification error test (RESET) for 
omitted variables. It also refits the model using new variables. The associated p-value 
needs to be insignificant in order to have a correctly specified model (Ramsey, 1969). 
Finally, after performing the above fit indices, we need to test the plausibility of the 
estimates from a theoretical standpoint and for the consistency of the predicted 
relationships between variables. 
5.2 MODEL COMPARISONS 
In Appendix E, Table 5.1 presents fit indices results of all models implemented by 
the MFP technique. The table indicates that model 2 shows the best-fit model among 
the rest. First, it shows the highest percentage of the outcome variances that were 
explained by this model (i.e. R2=52%). Model 6 shows the closest model in terms of the 
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coefficient of determination (i.e. R2=28%). Second, model 2 shows the most significant 
F statistic associated p-value (i.e. 0.0000) and the least value of Root MSE (i.e. 0.20) 
which indicates that the overall model is significant to predict Y1, while the closest 
model was model 1 with p-value and Root MSE equal to 0.0006 and 0.26 respectively. 
Third, model 2 show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the residual was 
normally distributed at level of 0.05 (swilk test’s p-value= 0.26). However, we can reject 
the null hypothesis for models 1 and 3 (i.e. p-value=0.005 and 0.009) respectively. 
Fourth, model 2 shows insignificant results associated with measures of 
heteroskedasticity at the level of 0.05 (i.e. imtest’s p-value = 0.44 and hettest’s p-value 
= 0.93) and that indicates the model has constant and identical residual variances. Fifth, 
model 2 shows insignificant results associated with model specification error tests 
(linktest and ovtest) at level of 0.05 (i.e. 0.31 and 0.22) respectively. Accordingly, this 
model does not need to be reconsidered for omitted variable bias.  
Model 1 examines the effect of four quarters lagged continuous covariates from 
financial statements on the first outcome “Y1” (the percentage change in stock market 
price during crisis time). The model finds only one significant negative linear relationship 
at a level of α = 0.05 between the average level of financial leverage ratio and 
dependent variable (Y1) as shown in equation (1). The mean level of financial leverage 
ratio is equal to 0.81709, which means approximately 82 percent of the total capital 
raised by debt or equivalently a debt multiplier equal to 1.20. For a firm that has a 
leverage ratio of one standard deviation (SD = 0.19) higher than the mean level (i.e. 
1.007), meaning that by itself the capital includes negative equity due to losses, the 
model finds a more than average decline in stock market price by 13.5 percent or a less 
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than average decline by 13.9 percent if it is one standard lower than mean level (i.e. 
0.62) which means only 62 percent of total capital raised by debt. 
(%Y1) = - 0.6368 – 0.7246*{Lev - 0.8203}       (1) 
Model 2 examines the effect of eight quarters lagged continuous covariates from 
financial reports on the first outcome “Y1” (the percentage change in stock market price 
during crisis time). The model finds two significant nonlinear relationships at the level of 
α = 0.05 between two financial ratios and the dependent variable (Y1) as shown in 
equation (2). The first is a negative relationship between the average level of financial 
leverage ratio (Lev) and change of stock market price as shown in Figure 5.1 in 
Appendix E.  
For a firm that has leverage ratio is one standard deviation higher than mean 
level when a crisis hit the economy (i.e. SD=0.18 and mean=0.82), the model finds a 
more than average decline in stock market price by 23.7 percent or a less than average 
decline by only 16.9 if the leverage ratio is one standard deviation lower than mean 
level. Equivalently, in debt multiplier terms, with a leverage ratio of one (total capital is 
equal to total debt), the model finds that stock market price will drop more than average 
by 23.7 percent, while at a ratio of 1.56 (total capital is higher than debt level by 56 
percent), the stock market price will drop less than average by 16.9 percent. Thus, the 
model shows a larger negative effect on an individual institution stock market price 
change than positive effect for one standard deviation change in either direction. This 
reveals the economic explanation for having cubed leverage ratio in this model.  
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Second, a positive relationship between the accumulated time-weighted rate of 
change of current ratio (rrCR) and the change in stock market price is shown in Figure 
5.2 in Appendix E. If a firm’s current assets grow at rate faster than that of current 
liabilities, that leads into higher growth rate of current ratio and improves its ability to 
meet its current obligations. Therefore, a firm that maintains positive accumulated rate 
of change of current ratio by one standard deviation (i.e. SD=0.22) higher than mean 
level (i.e. -0.0374), the model finds a less than average decline in stock price by 13.73 
percent or a more than average decline by 13.55 percent if it is one standard deviation 
below the mean. However, an observed outlier firm (HCBK) shows a negative 
relationship between this ratio and stock market change. Excluding this firm would result 
in having the same positive linear relationship between rrCR and Y1 and a very minimal 
effect on the first part (Lev) of the equation. Ultimately, Figures 5.3 and 5.4 in Appendix 
E show the predicted drops in stock market prices for financial firms covered in this 
study starting from the highest drop to the least according to their average levels of 
leverage ratios and the accumulated rate of change of current ratios over two years lag 
as predicted by model 2 in 2007q2 and 2007q3, respectively. 
(%Y1) = - 0.6111 – 0.5514*{(Lev)3 – 0.5690} + 0.0138*{[rrCR + 0.648]-0.5 – 1.2812} + 
0.6416*{[rrCR + 0.648] – 0.6092}        (2) 
Model 3 examines the effect of twelve quarters lagged continuous covariates 
from financial reports on the first outcome “Y1” (the percentage change in stock market 
price during crisis time). The model finds only one significant negative linear relationship 
at level of α = 0.05 between the accumulated growth rate of the ratio of financial 
leverage and first outcome Y1 as shown in equation (3). The interesting point about this 
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model is the inclusion of accumulated rate of change of leverage ratio instead of 
average level to predict the outcome by using longer lag (i.e. 12 quarters lag). The 
model finds a more than average decline in stock market price by 12.8 percent if 
accumulated growth rate of leverage ratio is higher than mean level by one standard 
deviation and a less than average decline by 11.15 percent if it is one standard 
deviation lower than mean level (i.e. SD=0.07 and mean level = -0.023).  
(%Y1) = - 0.6347 – 1.7112*{rrLev + 0.02781}       (3)  
Model 4 examines the effect of four quarters lagged continuous covariates from 
financial reports on the second outcome “Y2” (the percentage change in average stock 
market price during crisis time). The model finds only one significant negative linear 
relationship at level of 0.05 between the average level of financial leverage ratio and 
dependent variable (Y2) as shown in equation (4).  For a firm that has leverage ratio of 
one standard deviation higher than mean level (i.e. SD=0.19 and mean level = 
0.81709), the model finds a more than average decline in stock market price by 10.3 
percent or a less than average decline by 10.68 percent if it is one standard deviation 
lower than mean level. This means if the total debt represents only 62 percent of total 
capital, the stock market price tends to decline less than average by 11 percent.  
(%Y2) = - 0.4501 – 0.5527{Lev – 0.8203}       (4) 
Model 5 examines the effect of eight quarters lagged continuous covariates from 
financial reports on the second outcome “Y2” (the percentage change in average stock 
market price during crisis time). For a firm that is one standard deviation higher than 
mean level (i.e. SD=0.19 and mean level = 0.81709), the model finds a more than 
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average decline in stock market price by 10.14 percent or a less than average decline 
by 11.09 percent when leverage ratio is about one standard deviation (i.e. SD=0.18) 
above or lower mean level (i.e. 0.8285), respectively. This reveals the crucial role of 
capital structure in predicting the change of stock market price. If the total debt 
represents only 64 percent of total capital, the stock market price tends to decline less 
than average by 11 percent, but if debt represents 100 percent of total capital, a decline 
of stock market price more than average by 10 percent is the most likely.  
 (%Y2) = - 0.4377 – 0.59{Lev – 0.828}        (5) 
Model 6 examines the effect of twelve quarters lagged continuous covariates 
from financial reports on the second outcome “Y2” (the percentage change in average 
stock market price during crisis time). The model finds only one significant nonlinear 
relationship at level of 0.05 between the average level of investing cash flow per asset 
ratio and dependent variable (Y2) as shown in equation (6).  The model finds a more 
than average decline in stock market price by 40.44 percent for a firm that has a ratio 
above mean level by one standard deviation (i.e. SD=0.01408 and mean level= -
0.014466). On the other hand, if a firm is at one standard deviation lower than the 
mean, the model finds a more than average decline in stock market price by only 8.2 
percent. The only range that shows a less than average decline in stock market price 
when this ratio is lower than mean level by just one quarter of a standard deviation to -
0.01799, which causes a less than average decline in stock price only by 3.2 percent. 
Thus, a very short range of this ratio can have a positive impact on stock price and the 
economic analysis of having a sharp decline in stock prices when such ratio increases 
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is that an institution facing liquidity problems and selling assets would generate cash.1 
In addition, this model shows a better fit relative to models 4 and 5 which had the same 
outcome (Y2), and model 3 in which both share the same lag. 
(%Y2) = - 0.2967 – 8.0829*{[(ICF + 0.05969)*10]3 – 0.08467} – 15.1864*{[(ICF + 
0.05969)*10]3*log([(ICF + 0.05969)*10]) + 0.06968}      (6) 
From the previous discussion and model comparisons shown in Table 5.1, we 
found that model 2 is a good fit-model among the six models as it meets all criteria 
presented in this study. In most of the literature covered in this dissertation, capital 
structure as presented by leverage ratio was the major predictor of the financial crisis. 
Thus, model 2 offers the same results as much of the relevant literature, but with 
another dimension to measure a firm’s liquidity. The inclusion of the cubed financial 
leverage ratio gives this model additional explanatory power to predict the outcome (i.e. 
R2=52%). This nonlinear relationship between financial leverage ratio and the change in 
stock market price indicates a major impact on stock price if the ratio exceeds certain 
level above the mean, whereas the impact on stock price would be moderate if the ratio 
was below the mean by the same amount. Finally, the most important feature of model 
2 is that it is the only model to include two independent variables; the ratio of financial 
leverage as a measure of capital structure and current ratio as a measure of liquidity. 
The specific comparisons regarding the output of coefficients of these regressions are 
highlighted in Table 5.2 in Appendix E. 
 
                                                
1 An increase in the ratio of investing cash flow per asset indicates positive inflow of cash to the 
firm through the sale of investment assets which would be a sign of liquidity problems and buy 
new assets would show negative or outflow of cash. 
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6 OUT-OF-SAMPLE TESTS AND RESULTS  
The purpose of this dissertation is to introduce measures that provide regulators 
and a variety of financial reports’ users with early warning indicators associated with 
financial institution’s performance, profitability, and liquidity which will allow such firm to 
absorb unexpected economic downturns. For this goal, we conduct the out-of-sample 
test to test the best-fit model in this study (Model 2) as mentioned previously in chapter 
5. Model 2 provides two useful early warning indicators including financial leverage and 
a balance between current assets and current liabilities. These two balance sheet items 
can be used to predict to what extent a firm is impacted according to its fundamental 
characteristics relative to the industry levels given that a systemic event occurred.  
The period of the out-of-sample test was a period of recovery. Three subsamples 
generated from financial statements, each lagged on different periods (4, 8 and 12 
quarters) predict the expected change in stock market price between 2010q2 to 2011q1, 
proven to be a major rise as marked by benchmark. It is important to note that there is 
only one systemic event in the data. Therefore, the out-of-sample test examines the 
relationships between the same variables and change of stock market price. The output 
coefficients and the comparisons between models are shown in Tables 6.1 in Appendix 
F. 
We find only one positive significant relationship between current ratio “the 
balance between current asset and current liabilities” and the change of stock market 
price at level of 0.05. However, the ratio of leverage is not included. Model 2 in chapter 
5 is the only model to include current ratio in addition to financial leverage ratio as a set 
to predict the outcome. 
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The out-of-sample model finds that a firm that has higher current ratio than mean 
level by one standard deviation will expect a more than average rise in stock market 
price by 10 percent, or less than average rise by 10 percent if it is one standard 
deviation lower than mean level. In other words, if the average current asset is higher 
than average current liability by 79 percent, the model finds a more than average 
increase in stock market price by 10 percent, or less than average increase by the same 
percentage if the average current asset is almost equal to average current liability as 
shown in equation (7) and Figure 6.1 in Appendix F.  
(%Y1) = 0.18 + 0.118{CR – 0.952}       (7) 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
In this dissertation, we attempted to locate and analyze key economic factors that 
existed during the pre-crisis phase and the overall performance of individual firms in 
order to predict what firms will suffer the most based upon their pre-crisis performance. 
By examining each firm’s financial records by themselves, we analyzed indicators 
deviating from the norm from those financial reports as potential key warning signs. We 
also tested the outcomes against leading variables in order to understand how 
multinational firms identified in this study were affected.  
We used two estimation techniques to conduct the analysis, Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM) and Multivariable Fractional Polynomials (MFP), to examine which 
financial ratios could be used as early warning signals to a systemic crisis. The two 
models used in this dissertation attempted to predict the expected change in stock 
market price based upon an individual institution's current characteristics had a 
systemic crisis occurred. We implemented the two approaches to compute each 
financial ratio over three different lags. In the first approach, we calculated average 
levels of each ratio over each lag in order to eliminate outliers’ effects. In the second 
approach, we computed the accumulated time-weighted rate of change of each ratio 
over each lag in an attempt to address the pro-cyclicality issues where risk factors 
accumulated over periods of growing times.  
Both techniques found the two years lag to be the most significant period to 
predict the stock market effects of systemic crisis. The first technique (SEM) indicated 
that both approaches of computing the ratio of financial leverage were significant in 
terms of predicting the outcome after controlling for asset turnover, short- and long-term 
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investment assets, and current ratios as intervening variables. The second technique 
(MFP) found that the average level approach to calculate financial leverage and 
accumulated rate of change approach to calculate current ratio were both significant to 
predict stock market effects in such a crisis.  
SEM3-8Q Model was tested using the structural equation modeling technique 
which predicted stock market effects of systemic crisis as the best-fit model. A small 
change of financial leverage ratio would be amplified by the cubed function which 
reveals the economic explanation for having cubed leverage ratio to reflect its positive 
significant effect on assets turnover ratio (ATR-0.5) and its indirect negative effect on 
change of stock market price (Y1). For example, if the two years lagged cubed average 
level of leverage ratio increases by one standard deviation, it caused (ATR-0.5) to 
increase by 0.62 of its standard deviation. Thus, there was an indirect negative effect of 
the predictor variable (L3) on the outcome (Y1). If cubed financial leverage ratio 
increased or decreased by one standard deviation, (mean=0.6246, 1SD=0.2619) it 
caused a more or less than average decline in stock market price by 22.3 percent per 
unit respectively. In financial leverage terms, it is equivalent to an increase of financial 
leverage ratio from 0.854 to 0.96 (increased by 12.38 percent) or a decrease from 0.854 
to 0.71 (decreased by 16.57 percent) for that same more or less than average change 
in stock market price respectively. In other words, an individual firm that raises debts 
relative to equity to higher than the mean level (for example higher by 12.38 percent) 
would expect to experience a more than average drop in stock price by 6.8 percent had 
a crisis occurred. A firm would expect to see a less than average drop in stock market 
price by the same amount 6.8 percent if that firm had a leverage ratio lower than mean 
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level by 16.57 percent. A small increase of financial leverage caused a high drop of 
stock market price whereas a larger decrease of leverage is required to have the same 
impact on stock price in the opposite direction.  
The accumulated rate of change of the financial leverage ratio (rrL) showed two 
significant relationships with two other mediating variables. The first relationship was 
positive and significant with accumulated rate of change of short- and long-term 
investment asset ratio. The second relationship was negative and significant with 
accumulated rate of change of current ratio. Therefore, there was a negative indirect 
effect of the accumulated rate of change of leverage on the outcome Y1. In short, an 
institution that experienced growth in its leverage ratio over two years greater than 
mean level by one standard deviation should have expected a more than average 
decline in stock market price by 8.26 percent. However, if it was lower than the mean 
level by one standard deviation it should have expected a lower than average decline in 
stock market price by the same amount. In addition, the model indicated that the 
correlation between the accumulated rate of change and the average level of financial 
leverage was 0.33. 
The multivariable fractional polynomials technique introduced in model 2 
predicted stock market effects of systemic crisis as the best-fit model as shown in 
equation (2). The model found one negative significant nonlinear relationships at the 
level of α = 0.05 between the average level of leverage ratio and stock market effects of 
systemic crisis. For a firm that had a leverage ratio at one standard deviation higher 
than the mean level when a crisis hit (i.e. SD=0.18 and mean=0.82), the model found a 
greater than average decline in stock market price by 23.7 percent or a lower than 
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average decline in stock market price by only 16.9 percent if it was one standard 
deviation lower than the mean level. Equivalently in a debt multiplier terms, the leverage 
ratio of 1 (total capital was equal to total debt), the model found a more than average 
drop in stock market price by 23.7 percent, and at a ratio of 1.56 (total capital was 
higher than debt level by 56 percent), there was a less than average drop in stock 
market price by 16.9 percent. Thus, the model showed a larger negative effect on an 
individual institution stock market price change than positive effect for one standard 
deviation in either direction. This reveals the economic explanation for having cubed 
leverage ratio in this model.  
Another positive linear significant relationship was found between the 
accumulated rate of change of current ratio and change in stock market price. If a firm’s 
current assets grew at rate faster than that of current liabilities, that leads to a higher 
growth rate of the current ratio and improves the institution’s ability to meet its current 
obligations. Therefore, for a firm that maintained a positive accumulated current ratio 
higher than the mean level (i.e. -0.0374) by one standard deviation (i.e. SD=0.22), the 
model found that a less than average drop in stock price by 13.73 percent or a more 
than average drop by 13.55 percent if it was one standard deviation below the mean. In 
short, we found the multivariable fractional polynomials technique and model 2 to be 
more reliable and plausible relative to the structural equation modeling technique and 
model SEM3-8Q due to higher R2 (i.e. 52 percent versus 34 percent respectively) and 
because of its simplicity.  
To some extent the out-of-sample tests supported our conclusion. First, the eight 
quarters lagged model showed the highest explanatory power (i.e. R2=43.6 percent). 
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Second, the only significant predictor in the out-of-sample tests was the current ratio 
which was shown only in model 2 of the second approach (MFP) as another predictor 
alongside leverage ratio. The out-of-sample model found a positive significant linear 
relationship between the accumulated rate of change of current ratio and the change in 
stock market price, while in model 2 the relationship was between the average level of 
current ratio and the outcome. Yet, that still entailed a similar impact in terms of 
expected sign. For example, if the average current asset was higher than the average 
current liability by 79 percent, a higher than average rise in stock market price by 10 
percent would occur. However, if the current asset was almost equal to the current 
liability, the possible effect on stock market price would be a lower than average rise by 
11 percent which indicates that a firm will not be able to liquidate all current asset when 
required to meet its obligations as shown in Figure 6.1 and in equation (7). In addition, 
the out-of-sample results confirmed that the changes in pre-crisis stock prices are less 
sensitive to the leverage ratio but more sensitive during crisis as argued by many 
scholars.  
7.1 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Off-balance sheet items would play a crucial role in measuring and managing risk 
if they were pointed out and disclosed due to their expected large effects on various 
financial ratios. Thus, off-balance sheet items certainly increase financial risks and 
uncertainty. Consequently, more information about a financial institution’s position and 
performance would improve our prediction of quantifying the damage to a firm had a 
systemic crisis occurred. Studying off-balance sheet and cash flow items where positive 
cash flow (or liquidity) is the key to survival as creditors can be paid provides a good 
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opportunity to take preventive measures to keep an entity from heading into bankruptcy. 
Thus, they are potentially promising aspects for future research that would help 
minimize the effects of externality problems. 
Finally, financial regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
need to impose policies to ensure the reliability and accuracy of the information in 
financial statements. For example, hidden risks associate with off-balance sheet items, 
risks associated with counterparties, and the effectiveness of risk management in each 
firm should be disclosed in these reports. On the other side, regulating committees such 
as the Basel Committee need to impose rules to ensure firms’ ability to meet the need 
of capital during crises. However, many of the financial firms during the systemic crisis 
in 2008 were in compliance with the minimum capital requirements imposed by the 
Basel Committee, which indicated the importance of role of capital ratio and leverage 
requirements in an attempt to keep the banks from making too many risky investments. 
In fact, the massive rescues of these firms led to modify such capital requirements 
through introducing Basel III by implementing a 1/N rule for leverage ratio. In 2010, 
Basel Committee introduced a Tier I leverage ratio at three percent, which meant that 
an individual firm can leverage its equity up to 33 times. However, the total risk-adjusted 
capital requirement stays the same as before at 8 percent. The Tier I capital 
requirement will increase to 6 percent by 2019, and banks can use capital from Tier II to 
fill the gap between Tier I and total capital requirements. Andrew Haldane (2012) 
argued that a 7 percent leverage ratio instead of 3 percent was needed in order for 
large banks to survive the financial crisis in 2008, and a 4 percent leverage ratio is 
required to minimized Type I and II crisis errors. Therefore, more analysis and 
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investigation on capital structure ratio, which defined the relationship between equity 
and total capital, and the liquidity ratio, which proved to be an important predictor of 
firms’ performance during the crisis and post-crisis periods, are two potential promising 
fields for future research that would help minimize the effects of unexpected financial 
risks. 
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APPENDIX A 
This table contains the names and codes of the U.S. financial firms covered in this 
dissertation.   
Number Code Name Category 
1 AIG American International Group Inc Insurance 
2 ALL The Allstate Corporation Insurance 
3 AMP Ameriprise Financial, Inc. Others 
4 AXP American Express Company Others 
5 BAC Bank of America Corp Banks 
6 BBT BB&T Corporation Banks 
7 BK The Bank of New York Mellon 
Corporation 
Banks 
8 BLK BlackRock, Inc. Others 
9 BRK Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Insurance 
10 C Citigroup Inc Banks 
11 CB The Chubb Corporation Insurance 
12 CBH Commerce Bancorp Inc. Banks 
13 CMA Comerica Incorporated Banks 
14 CME Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
Holdings Inc. 
Others 
15 ETFC E TRADE Financial Corporation Brokers 
16 FIS Fidelity National Information Services Others 
17 FITB Fifth Third Bancorp Others 
18 FNMA Federal National Mortgage 
Association 
Others 
19 GS Goldman Sachs Group Inc Brokers 
20 HBAN Huntington Bancshares Incorporated Banks 
21 HCBK Hudson City Bancorp, Inc. Banks 
22 HIG Hartford Financial Services Group Insurance 
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Inc. 
23 HUM Humana Inc. Insurance 
24 JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co. Banks 
25 KEY KeyCorp Banks 
26 L Loews Corp. Insurance 
27 LEHMQ Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc Brokers 
28 MA MasterCard Inc. Others 
29 MER Merrill Lynch and Co. Inc. Brokers 
30 MI Marshall & Ilsley Corp. Others 
31 MS Morgan Stanley Brokers 
32 MTB M&T Bank Corporation Banks 
33 NCC National City Corporation Banks 
34 NTRS Northern Trust Corporation Banks 
35 NYB New York Community Bancorp Inc. Banks 
36 PBCT People's United Financial, Inc. Banks 
37 PGR The Progressive Corporation Insurance 
38 PNC Financial Services Inc. Banks 
39 RF Regions Financial Corporation Banks 
40 SCHW Charles Schwab Corp Brokers 
41 SNV Synovus Financial Corp. Banks 
42 STI SunTrust Banks, Inc. Banks 
43 STT State Street Corporation Banks 
44 TROW T. Rowe Price Group, Inc. Brokers 
45 TRV Travelers Companies Inc Insurance 
46 UB Unionbancal Corp. Banks 
47 UNP Union Pacific Corporation Others 
48 WAMUQ Washington Mutual Inc.  Banks 
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49 WB Wachovia Corp. Banks 
50 WFC Wells Fargo & Co Banks 
51 WU The Western Union Company Banks 
52 ZION Zions Bancorporation Banks 
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APPENDIX B 
This table shows the descriptions of all dependent and independent variables included 
in models implemented by both techniques covered in this study over two years lag. 
Variables Description  
Y1 Percent change in stock market price between max-point and min-point 
during the financial crisis from 2007q3 to 2009q1. 
Y2 Percent change in stock market price between average max-point and 
average min-point during the financial crisis from 2007q3 to 2009q1. 
m2L Average level of financial leverage ratio. 
m2O Average level of operating cash flow ratio. 
m2F Average level of financing cash flow ratio. 
m2IF Average level of investing cash flow ratio. 
m2R Average level of asset turnover ratio. 
m2Cr Average level of current ratio. 
m2I Average level of return on asset ratio. 
m2logA Natural logarithm of book-valued assets. 
m2A2a Average level of short- and long-term investment assets ratio.  
rr8qL Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of financial leverage ratio.  
rr8qO Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of operating cash flow ratio.  
rr8qF Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of financing cash flow ratio.  
rr8qIF Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of investing cash flow ratio.  
rr8qR Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of asset turnover ratio.  
rr8qCr Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of current ratio.  
rr8qI Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of return on asset ratio.  
rr8qA2a Accumulated time-weighted rate of change of short- and long-term 
investment assets ratio.  
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APPENDIX C 
Table 3.4: This table shows the correlation coefficients between variables included in 
both techniques SEM and MFP over two years lag. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: This table reports the summary statistics of the two measures of systemic 
crisis effects as presented by percent change in stock market price between max- and 
min-point (Y1) and percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2). 
 
 
     rr8qA2a     0.0293  -0.0295  -0.0869   0.5052  -0.3403   0.1467   1.0000
       rr8qI    -0.0224   0.0065   0.0112   0.3018   0.0082   1.0000
      rr8qCr    -0.0038   0.1122   0.0676  -0.0544   1.0000
       rr8qR    -0.0723   0.0490  -0.0276   1.0000
      rr8qIF    -0.0080  -0.0248   1.0000
       rr8qF    -0.0013   1.0000
       rr8qO     1.0000
                                                                             
                  rr8qO    rr8qF   rr8qIF    rr8qR   rr8qCr    rr8qI  rr8qA2a
     rr8qA2a    -0.3306  -0.1474   0.0724   0.0212   0.0277  -0.0505  -0.1183   0.2415   0.1284   0.2315   0.2512   0.5970
       rr8qI     0.1433   0.0653  -0.0319  -0.0524   0.0901  -0.0400   0.0111   0.1047   0.0278   0.1681  -0.0637   0.0782
      rr8qCr     0.4240   0.2469  -0.2006   0.0312   0.0054   0.1573   0.0096   0.1629   0.1622  -0.1607  -0.2015  -0.5141
       rr8qR    -0.0591  -0.1231   0.2952  -0.2547   0.1844   0.0742  -0.2450  -0.0275  -0.2001   0.4276   0.2350   0.3479
      rr8qIF     0.0216  -0.0463  -0.1448   0.2221  -0.0967   0.0785   0.0350   0.1420   0.3229  -0.2879  -0.0259  -0.0653
       rr8qF     0.0013   0.1305   0.1100  -0.0950   0.0935  -0.0440  -0.0624  -0.1359  -0.0959   0.1881   0.0705   0.0204
       rr8qO    -0.1247  -0.1622   0.0390  -0.0958  -0.1852   0.2909  -0.0222  -0.0318  -0.0352   0.0098   0.0815   0.0145
       rr8qL    -0.2746  -0.1555   0.3189   0.0856   0.1903  -0.2230   0.1694  -0.0651  -0.1264   0.2284   0.3040   1.0000
       m2A2a    -0.3670  -0.2322   0.7411  -0.5988   0.3506   0.1362  -0.4827  -0.4836  -0.5524   0.3769   1.0000
      m2logA    -0.4395  -0.4015   0.6051  -0.7149   0.2072   0.2641  -0.4692  -0.3318  -0.6051   1.0000
         m2I     0.3321   0.2396  -0.8791   0.8056  -0.4224  -0.1595   0.5105   0.8879   1.0000
        m2Cr     0.2888   0.1317  -0.7806   0.6355  -0.3126  -0.1392   0.4851   1.0000
         m2R     0.2459   0.1599  -0.5669   0.7889  -0.1647  -0.2807   1.0000
        m2IF    -0.1522  -0.1338   0.1414  -0.3430  -0.6702   1.0000
         m2F    -0.0451  -0.0580   0.4352  -0.3438   1.0000
         m2O     0.3189   0.2556  -0.7693   1.0000
         m2L    -0.4639  -0.3345   1.0000
          Y2     0.7431   1.0000
          Y1     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                     Y1       Y2      m2L      m2O      m2F     m2IF      m2R     m2Cr      m2I   m2logA    m2A2a    rr8qL
                                                                                                                            
          Y2   -.4404002  .3097637 -.0265341  2.783467        -1  .4076407        -1 -.6505669 -.4468667 -.2057838 -.0411814
          Y1   -.6175488  .3063824  .4385721  2.256917        -1   .131851        -1 -.9036094 -.6326801 -.3802816 -.0973291
                                                                                                                            
    variable        mean        sd  skewness  kurtosis       min       max        p5       p25       p50       p75       p95
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Table 3.6: This table reports the summary statistics of quarterly average levels of 
financial ratios over eight quarters lag.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7: This table reports the summary statistics of quarterly accumulated time-
weighted rate of change of financial ratios over eight quarters lag. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
      rr8qIF    7722.719  55994.19  6.692399  45.87327 -15565.92  387272.8 -521.4584 -16.60224 -.9684458  3.742968  255.7206
       rr8qF     910.378  7141.731  6.643512  45.46565 -3505.449  49211.14 -835.7147 -6.404725 -.5600202  11.74677   92.4893
       rr8qO    12.63988  227.1277  5.034445   32.3063 -330.3799  1426.156 -173.8326 -2.619771 -.3354729  1.709112  15.90511
      rr8qCr   -.0374583  .2275125  1.402547  10.76119 -.6480256   .994159 -.3429099 -.1539696 -.0266435  .0630403  .1934873
       rr8qL    -.014796  .1135865  -3.77755  23.62547 -.6635126  .2423602 -.1015183 -.0196134 -.0013072   .008327  .1027454
     rr8qA2a   -.0168037  .1451427 -.3845392  7.625019  -.474646  .4781195 -.2755856 -.0325033 -.0103976  .0180983  .2169541
       rr8qI   -.2048734  1.421793 -2.739468  11.72925 -5.959261  2.490877 -3.996121 -.2237224  .0038831  .1747086  .8932959
       rr8qR    -.087408  .4948336 -4.409453  27.14594  -3.03447  .7714185 -.6566904 -.0986376 -.0199621  .0682176  .2976477
                                                                                                                            
    variable        mean        sd  skewness  kurtosis       min       max        p5       p25       p50       p75       p95
                                                                                                                            
        m2IF   -.0138349  .0151521 -.9621272  4.358696 -.0640147  .0148109 -.0467937 -.0202635  -.010928 -.0036618  .0076367
         m2F    .0075889  .0173835   .506368  3.979907 -.0334844  .0614396 -.0184197 -.0043603   .004762  .0177593  .0424687
         m2O    .0083867  .0161757  1.508364  5.429089 -.0179863  .0617878 -.0130767  .0017081  .0040334   .009848  .0456184
        m2Cr    .9798077  1.332739   4.13471  22.95396   .147479  8.636918  .1811194  .2830393  .6050249  1.215891  2.522109
         m2L    .8209321  .1860514 -1.947439  6.244827  .1356153  1.039279  .4038329  .8106228  .8964493  .9160139  .9612442
       m2A2a    .7475525  .2277978 -1.486322  4.222622   .051604  .9817715  .2335908  .6908845  .8503312  .8759125  .9650185
      m2logA      11.351  1.645882 -.1027042  2.462259  7.867062  14.36913  8.531396  10.48935  11.47463  12.49797    14.091
         m2I    .0077326  .0101048  2.681981   10.2471  .0014979   .052131  .0017857   .002796  .0034481  .0076071  .0343078
         m2R    .0534731  .0927994   3.59769  18.46179  .0028784  .5595704  .0060968  .0124471  .0141236  .0558978  .2185627
                                                                                                                            
    variable        mean        sd  skewness  kurtosis       min       max        p5       p25       p50       p75       p95
. tabstat m2R m2I m2logA m2A2a m2L m2Cr m2O m2F m2IF, stat(mean sd sk k min max p5 p25 p50 p75 p95) c(s)
 105 
APPENDIX D 
 
Figure 4.1: This figure shows the concepts behind a set of models discussed in SEM1. 
This set of models examines the effect of both assets turnover ratio and time-weighted 
rate of change of current ratio upon both average level and accumulated rate of change 
of financial leverage ratios in order to predict the changes in stock market prices (%Y1 
and %Y2) over three different lags. Also, it shows the standardized outputs for model 
SEM1-Y1 over two years lag.  
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Figure 4.2: This figure shows the concepts behind a set of models discussed in SEM2. 
This set of models examines the effect of both assets turnover ratio and time-weighted 
rate of change of current ratio upon both average level and accumulated rate of change 
of financial leverage ratios, and adding another predictor variable, the natural log of 
firm’s asset (logA) in order to predict the changes in stock market prices (%Y1 and 
%Y2) over three different lags. Also, it shows the standardized outputs for model SEM2-
Y1 over two years lag. 
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Figure 4.3: This figure shows the concepts behind a set of models discussed in SEM3. 
This set of models examines the effect of assets turnover ratio and time-weighted rate 
of change of current ratio and rate of change of short- and long-term investment assets 
ratio upon both average level and accumulated rate of change of financial leverage 
ratios in order to predict the changes in stock market prices (%Y1 and %Y2) over three 
different lags. Also, it shows the standardized outputs for model SEM3-Y1 over two 
years lag. 
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Table 4.1: This table shows Fit Indices for models constructed by Structural Equation 
Modeling Technique forecasting the percent change in stock market price between 
max- and min-point (Y1) and percent change in stock market price between average-
max- and average-min-point (Y2) based on varying lags (4, 8, and 12 quarters lags) of 
firms’ characteristics variables at level of significance 0.05. This set of models shares 
the same hypothetical view of the relationships between these variables as discussed in 
SEM1 models. 
 DV=Y1                            DV=Y2 
Fit Indices SEM1-
4QY1 
SEM1-
8QY1 
SEM1-
12QY1 
SEM1-
4QY2 
SEM1-
8QY2 
SEM1-
12QY2 
X2 9.85 8.49 25.2 2.98 3.32 19.8 
P-value 0.079 0.131 0.000 0.702 0.650 0.001 
RMSEA 0.137 0.116 0.279 0.000 0.000 0.239 
Pclose 0.12 0.185 0.000 0.757 0.711 0.003 
AIC 234 189 248 243 200 254 
BIC 264 218 278 273 229 284 
CFI 0.915 0.939 0.63 1.00 1.00 0.67 
TLI 0.847 0.891 0.34 1.00 1.07 0.409 
CD 0.52 0.54 0.41 0.52 0.54 0.41 
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Table 4.2: This table shows Fit Indices for models constructed by Structural Equation 
Modeling Technique forecasting the percent change in stock market price between 
max- and min-point (Y1) and percent change in stock market price between average-
max- and average-min-point (Y2) based on varying lags (4, 8, and 12 quarters lags) of 
firms’ characteristics variables at level of significance 0.05. This set of models shares 
the same hypothetical view of the relationships between these variables as discussed in 
SEM2 models. 
 DV=Y1 DV=Y2 
Fit Indices SEM2-
4QY1 
SEM2-
8QY1 
SEM2-
12QY1 
SEM2-
4QY2 
SEM2-
8QY2 
SEM2-
12QY2 
X2 12.79 9.78 29.8 7.22 6.21 25.6 
P-value 0.077 0.201 0.000 0.406 0.515 0.001 
RMSEA 0.126 0.088 0.251 0.025 0.000 0.226 
Pclose 0.124 0.278 0.000 0.496 0.601 0.002 
AIC 418 371 432 427 384 440 
BIC 457 410 471 466 423 479 
CFI 0.909 0.956 0.647 0.996 1.00 0.656 
TLI 0.843 0.925 0.394 0.992 1.028 0.410 
CD 0.58 0.61 0.51 0.58 0.60 0.49 
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Table 4.3: This table shows Fit Indices for models constructed by Structural Equation 
Modeling Technique forecasting the percent change in stock market price between 
max- and min-point (Y1) and percent change in stock market price between average-
max- and average-min-point (Y2) based on varying lags (4, 8, and 12 quarters lags) of 
firms’ characteristics variables at level of significance 0.05. This set of models shares 
the same hypothetical view of the relationships between these variables as discussed in 
SEM3 models. 
 DV=Y1 DV=Y2 
Fit Indices SEM3-
4QY1 
SEM3-
8QY1 
SEM3-
12QY1 
SEM3-
4QY2 
SEM3-
8QY2 
SEM3-
12QY2 
X2 10.6 8.96 24.92 4.18 3.43 21.04 
P-value 0.221 0.345 0.002 0.840 0.904 0.007 
RMSEA 0.080 0.048 0.202 0.000 0.000 0.177 
Pclose 0.306 0.441 0.005 0.884 0.933 0.016 
AIC 144 122 232 153 135 240 
BIC 181 159 269 190 172 277 
CFI 0.964 0.987 0.745 1.00 1.00 0.769 
TLI 0.937 0.978 0.562 1.112 1.135 0.595 
CD 0.647 0.677 0.562 0.647 0.672 0.56 
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Table 4.4: This table shows the standardized coefficients for three models which 
present three different hypothetical views (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) that describe the 
expected relationships between financial ratios to predict the outcome. These three 
models regress the percent change in stock market price between the max- and min-
point (Y1) on financial institutions’ characteristics (ATR: average level of asset turn over, 
rrCR: accumulated rate of change of current ratio, rrA2a: accumulated rate of change of 
short- and long-term investment assets, logA: natural log of total assets, Lev: average 
level of leverage ratio, and rrLev: accumulated rate of change of leverage ratio). All 
models regressed over 4 quarters lag by the use of Structural Equation Modeling 
Technique. 
 
 SEM1-4Q SEM2-4Q SEM3-4Q 
DV 
IV 
rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 rrA2a rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 
ATR-0.5   -
0.3866
*** 
(0.108) 
  -
0.2364 
(0.127) 
   -
0.3929
*** 
(0.107) 
rrA2a          -
0.1078 
(0.121) 
rrCR   0.3556
** 
(0.110) 
  0.3021
** 
(0.112) 
   0.3186
** 
(0.118) 
LogA      -
0.3433
** 
(0.128) 
    
Lev3  0.5837
*** 
(0.091) 
  0.5837
*** 
(0.091) 
   0.5837
*** 
(0.091) 
 
rrLev -
0.5266
*** 
(0.101) 
  -
0.5272
*** 
(0.101) 
  0.5767
*** 
(0.093) 
-
0.5263
*** 
(0.101) 
  
Const. -
0.0012 
0.6915
* 
-
1.241*
** 
-
0.0037 
0.6915
* 
0.850 
(0.828) 
-
0.0737 
-
0.0013 
0.6915
* 
-
1.230*
** 
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(0.119) (0.338) (0.349) (0.119) (0.338) (0.115) (0.119) (0.338) (0.337) 
X2 0.0793 0.0773 0.2207 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between max- and min-point 
(Y1) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1 
 
Table 4.5: This table shows the standardized coefficients for three models which 
present three different hypothetical views (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) that describe the 
expected relationships between financial ratios to predict the outcome. These three 
models regress the percent change in stock market price between the max- and min-
point (Y1) on financial institutions’ characteristics (ATR: average level of asset turn over, 
rrCR: accumulated rate of change of current ratio, rrA2a: accumulated rate of change of 
short- and long-term investment assets, logA: natural log of total assets, Lev: average 
level of leverage ratio, and rrLev: accumulated rate of change of leverage ratio). All 
models regressed over 8 quarters lag by the use of Structural Equation Modeling 
Technique. 
 
 SEM1-8Q SEM2-8Q SEM3-8Q 
DV 
IV 
rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 rrA2a rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 
ATR-0.5   -
0.3694
** 
(0.112) 
  -
0.1890 
(0.129) 
   -0.36** 
(0.110) 
rrA2a          -
0.1949 
(0.124) 
rrCR   0.3653
** 
(0.116) 
  0.3347
** 
(0.111) 
   0.2980
* 
(0.124) 
LogA      -
0.3702
** 
(0.124) 
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Lev3  0.6175
*** 
(0.085) 
  0.6175
*** 
(0.085) 
   0.6175
*** 
(0.085) 
 
rrLev -
0.5225
*** 
(0.105) 
  -
0.5215
*** 
(0.105) 
  0.6049
*** 
(0.091) 
-
0.5223
*** 
(0.105) 
  
Const. -
0.2211 
(0.123) 
0.709* 
(0.332) 
-
1.183*
* 
(0.347) 
-
0.2256 
(0.123) 
0.709* 
(0.332) 
0.9652 
(0.770) 
-
0.0430 
(0.115) 
-
0.2232 
(0.123) 
0.709* 
(0.332) 
-
1.242*
** 
(0.345) 
X2 0.1312 0.2009 0.3450 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between max- and min-point 
(Y1) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1 
 
Table 4.6: This table shows the standardized coefficients for three models which 
present three different hypothetical views (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) that describe the 
expected relationships between financial ratios to predict the outcome. These three 
models regress the percent change in stock market price between the max- and min-
point (Y1) on financial institutions’ characteristics (ATR: average level of asset turn over, 
rrCR: accumulated rate of change of current ratio, rrA2a: accumulated rate of change of 
short- and long-term investment assets, logA: natural log of total assets, Lev: average 
level of leverage ratio, and rrLev: accumulated rate of change of leverage ratio). All 
models regressed over 12 quarters lag by the use of Structural Equation Modeling 
Technique. 
 
 SEM1-12Q SEM2-12Q SEM3-12Q 
DV 
IV 
rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 rrA2a rrCR ATR-0.5 Y1 
ATR-0.5   -
0.4611
*** 
(0.109) 
  -
0.2545 
(0.139) 
   -
0.4464
*** 
(0.109) 
rrA2a          -
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0.1614 
(0.122) 
rrCR   0.1365 
(0.128) 
  0.1330 
(0.121) 
   0.1397 
(0.125) 
LogA      -
0.3928
** 
(0.131) 
    
Lev3  0.6395
*** 
(0.081) 
  0.6395
*** 
(0.081) 
   0.6395
*** 
(0.081) 
 
rrLev -
0.0854
8 
(0.143) 
  -
0.0849 
(0.142) 
  0.5158
*** 
(0.106) 
-
0.0855 
(0.143) 
  
Const. -
0.0647 
(0.148) 
0.6527
* 
(0.325) 
-
0.969* 
(0.375) 
-
0.0664 
(0.148) 
0.6527
* 
(0.325) 
0.9652 
(0.770) 
0.1348 
(0.124) 
-
0.0647 
(0.148) 
0.6527
* 
(0.325) 
-
0.997*
* 
(0.370) 
X2 0.0001 0.0001 0.0016 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between max- and min-point 
(Y1) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1 
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Table 4.7: This table shows the standardized coefficients for three models which 
present three different hypothetical views (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) that describe the 
expected relationships between financial ratios to predict the outcome. These three 
models regress the percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) on financial institutions’ characteristics (ATR: average level of 
asset turn over, rrCR: accumulated rate of change of current ratio, rrA2a: accumulated 
rate of change of short- and long-term investment assets, logA: natural log of total 
assets, Lev: average level of leverage ratio, and rrLev: accumulated rate of change of 
leverage ratio). All models regressed over 4 quarters lag by the use of Structural 
Equation Modeling Technique. 
 SEM1-4Q SEM2-4Q SEM3-4Q 
DV 
IV 
rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 rrA2a rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 
ATR-0.5   -
0.3193
** 
(0.119) 
  -
0.1627 
(0.138) 
   -
0.3221
** 
(0.119) 
rrA2a          -
0.0447 
(0.132) 
rrCR   0.2577
* 
(0.121) 
  0.1988 
(0.123) 
   0.2426 
(0.130) 
LogA      -
0.345* 
(0.136) 
    
Lev3  0.5837
*** 
(0.091) 
  0.5837
*** 
(0.091) 
   0.5837
*** 
(0.091) 
 
rrLev -
0.526*
** 
(0.101) 
  -
0.526*
** 
(0.101) 
  0.577*
** 
(0.093) 
-
0.526*
** 
(0.101) 
  
Const. -
0.0014 
(0.119) 
0.6915
* 
(0.338) 
-0.78* 
(0.328) 
-
0.0037 
(0.119) 
0.6915
* 
(0.338) 
1.3419 
(0.874) 
-
0.0734 
(0.115) 
-
0.0014 
(0.119) 
0.6915
* 
(0.338) 
-
0.7768
* 
(0.327) 
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X2 0.7021 0.4062 0.8398 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1 
 
Table 4.8: This table shows the standardized coefficients for three models which 
present three different hypothetical views (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) that describe the 
expected relationships between financial ratios to predict the outcome. These three 
models regress the percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) on financial institutions’ characteristics (ATR: average level of 
asset turn over, rrCR: accumulated rate of change of current ratio, rrA2a: accumulated 
rate of change of short- and long-term investment assets, logA: natural log of total 
assets, Lev: average level of leverage ratio, and rrLev: accumulated rate of change of 
leverage ratio). All models regressed over 8 quarters lag by the use of Structural 
Equation Modeling Technique. 
 
 SEM1-8Q SEM2-8Q SEM3-8Q 
DV 
IV 
rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 rrA2a rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 
ATR-0.5   -
0.3172
* 
(0.123) 
  -0.132 
(0.143) 
   -0.146* 
(0.123) 
rrA2a          -
0.0544 
(0.136) 
rrCR   0.1802 
(0.128) 
  0.1541 
(0.122) 
   0.1619 
(0.136) 
LogA      -
0.3684
** 
(0.136) 
    
Lev3  0.6175
*** 
  0.6175
*** 
   0.6175
*** 
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(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) 
rrLev -
0.5151
*** 
(0.105) 
  -
0.514*
** 
(0.105) 
  0.5998
*** 
(0.092) 
-
0.5148
*** 
(0.105) 
  
Const. -
0.2323 
(0.123) 
0.7092
* 
(0.332) 
-
0.7123
* 
(0.343) 
-0.234 
(0.123) 
0.7092
* 
(0.332) 
1.428 
(0.829) 
-
0.0386 
(0.115) 
-
0.2323 
(0.123) 
0.7092
* 
(0.332) 
-
0.7274
* 
(0.345) 
X2 0.6502 0.5149 0.9043 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1 
 
Table 4.9: This table shows the standardized coefficients for three models which 
present three different hypothetical views (SEM1, SEM2, and SEM3) that describe the 
expected relationships between financial ratios to predict the outcome. These three 
models regress the percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) on financial institutions’ characteristics (ATR: average level of 
asset turn over, rrCR: accumulated rate of change of current ratio, rrA2a: accumulated 
rate of change of short- and long-term investment assets, logA: natural log of total 
assets, Lev: average level of leverage ratio, and rrLev: accumulated rate of change of 
leverage ratio). All models regressed over 12 quarters lag by the use of Structural 
Equation Modeling Technique. 
 
 SEM1-12Q SEM2-12Q SEM3-12Q 
DV 
IV 
rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 rrA2a rrCR ATR-0.5 Y2 
ATR-0.5   -
0.3384
** 
(0.128) 
  -0.137 
(0.154) 
   -
0.3339
* 
(0.128) 
rrA2a          -
0.0624 
(0.130) 
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rrCR   0.0381 
(0.138) 
  0.0417 
(0.131) 
   0.0364 
(0.137) 
LogA      -
0.374*
* 
(0.140) 
    
Lev3  0.6395
*** 
(0.081) 
  0.6395
*** 
(0.081) 
   0.6395
*** 
(0.081) 
 
rrLev -0.081 
(0.143) 
  -
0.0805 
(0.142) 
  0.512*
** 
(0.106) 
-
0.0811 
(0.143) 
  
Const. -
0.0692 
(0.148) 
0.6527
* 
(0.325) 
-
0.6952 
(0.366) 
-
0.0687 
(0.148) 
0.6527
* 
(0.325) 
1.377 
(0.824) 
0.1385 
(0.126) 
-
0.0692 
(0.148) 
0.6527
* 
(0.325) 
-
0.7050 
(0.366) 
X2 0.0013 0.0006 0.0070 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1 
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Figure 4.4: Average Level of Asset Turnover Ratio versus Y1 
 
Figure 4.5: Accumulated Rate of Change of Short- and Long-term Investment 
Assets Ratio versus Y1 
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Figure 4.6: Accumulated Rate of Change of Current Ratio versus Y1 
 
Figure 4.7: Average Level of Leverage Ratio versus Y1 
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Figure 4.8: Accumulated Rate of Change of Leverage Ratio versus Y1 
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Table 4.10: This table shows mean levels of each predictor, their values at one 
standard deviation away from mean level in both directions, and the predicted change 
from the average in stock market price by model SEM3-8Q to predict Y1 accordingly.  
Predictor Variables Values Predicted %Δ in Stock Price 
 (Lev)3 @ mean +1SD = 0.886 
Lev @ 0.96  (+12.38%)  
-6.8% 
Leverage Ratio: 
(Total Debt / Total Capital) 
(Lev)3 @ mean = 0.6246 
Lev @ 0.854 
0.0 
 (Lev)3 @ mean -1SD = 0.362 
Lev @ 0.713 (-16.57%) 
+6.8% 
 rrLev @ mean +1SD = 0.98 -8.26% 
Accumulated Rate of Change 
of Leverage Ratio 
rrLev @ mean = -0.014 0.0 
 rrLev @ mean -1SD = -0.127 +8.26% 
 (ATR)-0.5 @ mean +1SD = 
10.70 
ATR @ 0.0087  (-53.07%)  
-11.01% 
Asset Turnover Ratio 
(Total Revenue / Average 
Asset) 
(ATR)-0.5 @ mean = 7.336 
ATR @ 0.0185 
0.0 
 (ATR)-0.5 @ mean -1SD = 
3.963 
ATR @ 0.0636 (+242.6%) 
+11.016% 
 rrCR @ mean +1SD = 0.19 9.18% 
Accumulated Rate of Change 
of Current Ratio: 
rrCR @ mean = -0.037 0.0 
 rrCR @ mean -1SD = -0.264 -9.18% 
 rrA2a @ mean +1SD = 0.129 -5.81% 
Accumulated Rate of Change 
of Short- and Long-term 
Investment Assets Ratio 
rrA2a @ mean = -0.016 0.0 
 rrA2a @ mean -1SD = -0.161 +5.81% 
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APPENDIX E 
 
Table 5.1: This table shows Fit Indices for Multivariable Fractional Polynomials Models 
1 Through 6 predicting the percent change in stock market price between max- and 
min-point (Y1) and percent change in stock market price between average-max- and 
average-min-point (Y2) during the systemic crisis in 2008. 
Model # R2 aR2 Swilk Root 
MSE 
F-stat 
p-valu 
Im p-
value 
Het p-
valu 
Link 
p-valu 
Ov p-
value 
MFP4QY1 1 0.21 0.20 0.005 0.26 0.0006 0.23 0.62 0.019 0.07 
MFP8QY1 2 0.52 0.49 0.260 0.20 0.0000 0.44 0.93 0.317 0.22 
MFP12QY1 3 0.21 0.19 0.009 0.27 0.0016 0.02 0.27 0.077 0.26 
MFP4QY2 4 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.29 0.0185 0.49 0.12 0.063 0.04 
MFP8QY2 5 0.11 0.09 0.28 0.29 0.02 0.52 0.15 0.055 0.07 
MFP12QY2 6 0.28 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.0011 0.43 0.80 0.483 0.86 
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Table 5.2: This table reports the coefficients of regressing two measures of systemic 
effects (the percent change in stock market price between max- and min-point (Y1) and 
percent change in stock market price between average-max- and average-min-point 
(Y2)) on one-year, two-years, and three-years lagged financial institutions’ ratios by 
using fractional polynomials regression technique at level of significance 0.05.   
Dependent 
Variable 
Y1 Y2 
Significant 
financial 
variables 
selected by 
models 
(1) 
Four 
Quarters 
Lag 
(2) 
Eight 
Quarters 
Lag 
(3) 
Twelve 
Quarters 
Lag 
(4) 
Four 
Quarters 
Lag 
(5) 
Eight 
Quarters 
Lag 
(6) 
Twelve 
Quarters 
Lag 
f (m1L) -0.7246*** 
(0.1986) 
  -0.5527* 
(0.2266) 
  
f (m2L)  -0.5514*** 
(0.1309) 
  -0.5900* 
(0.2451) 
 
f1 (rr8qCr)  0.01381** 
(0.00412) 
    
f2 (rr8qCr)  0.64166*** 
(0.1486) 
    
f (rr12qL)   -1.7112** 
(0.5048) 
   
f1 (m3IF)      -8.0829*** 
(2.116) 
f2 (m3IF)      -15.186** 
(4.6339) 
Constant -0.6368*** 
(0.0368) 
-0.6111*** 
(0.0317) 
-0.634*** 
(0.04117) 
-0.4501*** 
(0.0420) 
-0.4377*** 
(0.424) 
-0.2967*** 
(0.05725) 
Obs. 50 48 43 50 48 43 
R2 0.2171 0.5251 0.2189 0.1102 0.1119 0.2871 
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Adj. R2 0.2008 0.4927 0.1998 0.0917 0.0926 0.2515 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between max- and min-point 
(Y1) and percent change in stock market price between average-max- and average-min-point 
(Y2) during the financial crisis from 2007q3 until 2009q1. 
Independent Variables: every model starts with the total of 17 independent variables over the 
same lag to end up with the selected significant variables as shown in the table above in the 
transformed forms as presented in each equation accordingly.  
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Figure 5.1: Average Level of Leverage Ratio versus Y1 
 
Figure 5.2: Accumulated Rate of Change of Current Ratio versus Y1 
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Figure 5.3: The predicted drops in stock market prices starting from the highest to the 
least according to Model 2 by the use of MFP Technique as of 2007Q2 
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Figure 5.4: The predicted drops in stock market prices starting from the highest to the 
least according to Model 2 by the use of MFP Technique as of 2007Q3 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Table 6.1: This table shows the coefficients from Multivariable Fractional Polynomials 
Techniques forecasting the percent change in stock market price between min- and 
max-point (2010q2 – 2011q1) based on one-year, two-years, and three-years lags of 
financial institutions characteristics. 
Dependent 
Variable 
Y1 
Significant 
Financial 
Variables  
(1) 
Four Quarters Lag 
(2) 
Eight Quarters Lag 
(3) 
Twelve Quarters Lag 
    
f (Cr) 0.1159*** 
(0.02) 
0.1180*** 
(0.02) 
0.1152*** 
( 0.02) 
Constant 0.1869*** 
(0.02) 
0.1869*** 
(0.02) 
0.1869*** 
(0.02) 
Obs. 45 45 45 
R2 0.4281 0.4364 0.4314 
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
Dependent Variables: the percent change in stock market price between min- and max-point 
(2010q2 – 2011q1) 
Independent Variables: every model starts with the total of 17 independent variables over the 
same lag to end up with the selected significant variables as shown in the table above in the 
transformed forms as presented in the equation (7).  
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Figure 6.1: Average Level of Current Ratio versus Y1 (Out-of-Sample Test) 
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